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USSR Report

HUMAN RESOURCES

No. 26

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CONTENTS

LABOR

Incentive Funds in Eleventh Five-Year Plan
(Yu. M. Artemov; FINANSY SSSR, Oct 80) 1

Manpower Problems Put in Marxist Context
(P. Paster; EKONOMIKA SOVETSKOY UKRAINY, Oct 80) 11

Gosplan Executive Urges Journalists to Promote Stronger Discipline
(Yevgeniy Voronin; ZHURNALIST, Jan 81) 23

Labor Productivity Decreases During Night Shifts
(SOVESTSKAYA ROSSIYA, 1 Nov 80) 29

DEMOGRAPHY

Statistical Data on Union Republics As of Jan 1, 1980
(VESTNIK STATISTIKI, Dec 80) 34

Demographic, Social Aspects of Rural Development
(V. Perevedentsev; SOVETSKAYA POTREBITEL'SKAYA KOOPERATSIYA, Oct 80) 45

Distribution of Population According to Sources of Income, Data on Nation's Women
(Aleksandra Fedorovna Ul'yanova et al.; VESTNIK STATISTIKI, Jan 81) 53

Mixed-Nationality Marriages Discussed by Ethnographer
(L. N. Terent'yeva Interview; SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 27 Dec 80) ... 82

LABOR

INCENTIVE FUNDS IN ELEVENTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Moscow FINANSY SSSR in Russian No 10, Oct 80 pp 12-17

/Article by Yu. M. Artemov, professor: "Incentive Funds in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan"/

/Text/ Material incentive from profit is an important part of the wages of industrial workers. In 1978 bonuses and other kinds of awards from the material incentive fund acounted for 7.5 percent of the average wage, including 20 percent for engineering and technical workers. For the formation of the material incentive fund this year 6.6 billion rubles from profit, which was 9.1 percent of all profit, were put into this fund. In this manner, reliable sources of material incentive have now been created in industry.

Many production collectives are putting material incentive funds to good use to stimulate a rise in production efficiency and product quality. An increase in the absolute amount of bonuses and their percentage of wages is accompanied by a fast growth in basic estimative indicators of the work of the enterprises.

At the same time in recent years the shortcomings in the mechanism for forming economic stimulation funds have been more evident. They have had a small effect upon an improvement in final results.

The measures called for the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of 12 July 1979 "Concerning the improvement in planning and strengthening the influence of the economic mechanism upon raising production efficiency and product quality" call for a substantial change in the economic mechanism for material stimulation. The material incentive system will be made directly dependent upon the efficiency and quality of work, the fulfillment of planned assignments and results of production activity. Starting with the Eleventh Five-Year Plan there will be a qualitatively new system of material stimulation, aimed at raising the creative initiative of labor collectives. It will be an integral part of the new economic mechanism.

The changes, which are being made to the material incentive system, will not be restricted to the incentive funds. They are of a broad nature. One of the most important features of these measures is the strengthening of the role of the wage fund and, subsequently, the basic salary in material stimulation. With the introduction of a standard method of planning the connection between the wage fund and indicators of production activity will become more firm. In this plan the wage and material incentive funds will largely come together; they will be formed on the basis of long-term economic norms, which are established in the five-year plan and distributed by year.

Strengthening the cost accounting /khozraschet/ sources in the formation of the wage fund makes it possible to carry out a specific demarcation of the stimulating purpose of the two funds. Stimulation to increase the amount of production will basically be accomplished when forming the wage fund by norms. The material incentive fund will to a large extent promote an improvement in the qualitative indicators of work. It must be emphasized that the switch to a standard planning method of the wage fund stimulates a growth in labor productivity as well, because the savings as opposed to the norm, which is formed as the result of freeing workers to do other work, is used for additional incentive.

The main thing that distinguishes the new method of forming incentive funds is the switch to indicators which orient the production collectives toward achieving higher final national economic results. Material stimulation in industry will be accomplished primarily in dependence upon fulfillment of the plan for product deliveries by product list and within time periods corresponding to standing contracts and for raising labor productivity and product quality.

The labor productivity growth indicator in relation to the plan of the base year 1980 and the indicator of the percentage of highest quality category of total production will be used to form the funds during the planning and formation of funds. As concerns the indicator of fulfillment of the delivery plan, it will determine an increase or decrease in the deductions for the material incentive fund during the year.

For industry on the whole and for individual enterprises the reduction in production costs by decreasing the consumption of materials used in the manufacture of product and improving the use of fixed assets are a very real problem. For this reason for the incentive system to have the greatest impact on the more important aspects of production the material incentive fund can be formed by such indicators as the conservation of material resources, raising the output-capital ratio, the shift coefficient, the level of profitability and the reduction of production cost.

It is planned that each enterprise will use two fund forming indicators. In some sectors of the economy they will use three; the labor productivity indicator must be used in either case.

In the extracting sectors the material incentive funds can be formed depending upon product output in physical terms; in several sectors of the light, food, meat and dairy and fish industries they can be formed depending upon production growth in monetary terms.

The labor productivity and quality indicators were used in the fund forming system. However, they did not play the needed role since they affected the formation of an insignificant portion of the material incentive fund.

In the Eleventh Five-Year Plan the very method of estimating these indicators will change in connection with the fact that the planning and evaluation of results will be done according to net (standard) output rather than according to gross output. This will make it possible to objectively evaluate the specific contribution of each collective to production and to coordinate the amounts of material incentive with it.

Of particular importance is the switchover to forming economic stimulation funds by stable norms, which have been approved in differentiated amounts for each year of the five-year plan. It is important that the norms, as a rule, will be established by sectors (subsectors) and groups of production associations (enterprises) and only for some enterprises will they be individualized. This raises the stimulation effect of the fund forming system and makes it possible to rely on indicators that are average for a large group of production associations (enterprises) when awarding bonuses.

The basic difference of the formation of the material incentive fund in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan is that their connection with profit is increased. The growth in profit is one of the most important indicators for evaluating the results of economic activity. Deductions for the material incentive fund in the majority of sectors is to be based on norms established as a percentage of profit (estimated profit). In this manner the size of the funds through norms is coordinated with the amount of profit. Until now the norms were established either as a percentage of the wage fund - in the Eighth and Ninth five-year plans, or as a percentage of the material incentive fund - in the Tenth Five-Year Plan. Profit in essence formally played the role of a source of incentive, because the size of the funds depended very little upon the amount of profit. The determination of the norms as a percentage of profit significantly strengthens the stimulation role of both profit and the material incentive funds.

It must be noted that to determine the amount of the material incentive fund the norms will be used in relation to the profit accepted for the appropriate year in control figures, the five-year plan and the annual plan; but when making deductions during the course of the year the norms will be in relation to the actual profit. In this manner, with a constant relative value of the norm the absolute sum of the deductions that corresponds to the norm is flexible and depends upon the change in profit. This procedure, without doubt, promotes the acceptance of higher assignments for profit when compiling five-year and annual plans, and also the overfulfillment of the profit plan throughout the year.

And finally, an important difference of the new mechanism for forming the material incentive fund that is being introduced is that it stimulates the development of a more taut five-year plan as compared with the control figures. Until now absolute sums for the material incentive funds were established for the ministries and associations (enterprises) in the five-year plan. They changed according to norms only when there were deviations in the indicators of the annual plan from the appropriate assignments of the five-year plan. Not only did this not motivate anyone to accept a higher five-year plan, but, on the contrary, it created a desire to lower the plan. Now, having raised the control figures in the five-year plan, the ministries, associations and enterprises will be able to plan increased material incentive funds.

In the Basic Statutes governing the formation and expenditure of the material incentive fund and the fund for social and cultural activities and housing construction (incentive funds) in 1981 through 1985 in industry there will also be several substantial differences from the presently existing procedure. We shall now discuss the features of forming the incentive funds at various stages in the compiling and carrying out of the five-year and annual plans.

The fund forming process in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan will be accomplished in four stages. When raising control figures and compiling the five-year and annual plans the fund is planned; while fulfilling the annual plans the fund is actually formed.

The formation of incentive funds will be done in the following sequence:

1. The higher ranking organizations develop and bring in to the ministries, associations and enterprises economic norms in the form of control figures for determining the amounts of the material incentive funds with a distribution by year.

2. In accordance with these norms the absolute amounts of the incentive funds for the ministries, associations and enterprises are estimated in the five-year plan with a distribution by year. The higher-ranking organizations approve in the five-year plan of the subdepartmental organizations stable norms for the formation of incentive funds in differentiated amounts for each year of the five-year plan.

3. When drawing up and approving the annual plans in accordance with the stable norms, which were established in the five-year plan, the amount of the incentive funds for the corresponding year is determined.

4. The production associations (enterprises) will make deductions from profit into the incentive fund throughout the year. The amount of the deductions will be dependent upon the degree that the plan is fulfilled.

Thus, the stimulation to accept more taut assignments under the new fund forming system is significantly increased. The incentive funds can be increased in three stages - when drawing up indicators for the five-year plan that are higher than the control figures, when drawing up indicators for the annual plan that are higher than the five-year plan, and when overfulfilling the indicators of the annual plan. At the same time the material responsibility is strengthened, since the incentive funds decrease when indicators are reduced.

It should be noted that the norms which the ministries, associations and enterprises receive in their control figures serve only to estimate the incentive funds in the five-year plan. Stable norms, which are approved in the five-year plan, are used to estimate the incentive funds in the annual plans and to increase (decrease) the funds when the plan is overfulfilled (underfulfilled). They differ from the norms of the control figures in connection with the acceptance in the five-year plan of increased (reduced) assignments as compared with the control figures.

Determining the amount of the norms, provided for the subdepartmental organizations within the control figures, is a very complicated and important task. The absolute amount and the dynamics of the incentive funds throughout the five-year plan depend largely upon the level of these norms. During this process it is necessary to ensure that economically sound balances in the growth of labor productivity, profit and the wage fund are observed; when possible, it is also necessary to eliminate unjustified differences in paying bonuses to workers of individual associations and enterprises. The assignments of the control figures according to the fund forming indicators and the sum of the incentive funds, used in the estimates to the control figures, serve as the initial basis for estimating the norms. When analyzing the level of the material incentive fund it is necessary to evaluate the influence of various factors on the fund in order to ensure that the labor collectives receive equal bonuses.

As previously noted, in the majority of the sectors the norms will be established as a percentage of profit according to two indicators - the growth of labor productivity and the total percentage of manufactured product that is of the highest category of quality. To determine their amount the sum of the material incentive fund, used in the estimates for the control figures for a given group of enterprises, is divided into two parts. One part is divided by the growth of labor productivity in an increasing total against the 1980 plan; the other part is divided by the percentage of total product that is of the highest category of quality, called for in the control figures for a given year of the five-year plan.

In the Eleventh Five-Year Plan when determining norms for the associations and enterprises from the total incentive funds for the entire ministry a significantly larger portion than previously is excluded; it is earmarked for the reserve (centralized funds) of the ministry or all-union (republic) industrial association. Its increase from 10 percent to 15 percent was caused by several circumstances. Experience has shown that 10 percent is clearly inadequate to ensure the stability of the norms and the coordination of the amount of the incentive funds of the associations and enterprises with their total sum for the ministry. In addition, the burden on the reserves and centralized funds is increasing; they are becoming a source for increasing the incentive funds of the associations and enterprises in a large number of cases. It should be noted that raising the amount of the reserves and centralized funds does not damage the awarding of bonuses to workers directly in the associations and enterprises, for ultimately the assets of the reserves and centralized funds are used to augment the incentive funds of the associations and enterprises.

The size of the norms for each of the fund-forming indicators and their correlation will depend directly upon the proportion in which the sum of the material incentive fund, used in the estimates for the control figures, is divided into two parts. In the examples given in the Basic Statutes the sum of the funds is divided in half. But this does not mean that such a proportion is common for all cases. The ministries have the right to differentiate norms by changing a portion of the material incentive fund that is earmarked for stimulating the fulfillment of a particular indicator. When estimating the norm for growth in labor productivity in all cases no less than 50 percent of the fund must be used. We believe that this is necessary because of the substantial differences in the percentage of product that is of the highest category of quality for the ministries, industrial associations and groups of production associations (enterprises) and because of the special features of using this indicator in the formation of funds. We shall examine this question in a theoretical example, having assumed for the sake of clarity that the sum of the material incentive fund, used for estimating the norms, and the amount of profit are the same for different groups of enterprises and, consequently, the norms can be expressed as a percentage of the material incentive fund.

Table 1

	Enterprise A	Enterprise B	Enterprise C
1	2	3	4
1. Growth in labor productivity (percentage of 1980 plan)	110	110	110
2. Portion of incentive fund used to estimate norm for growth in labor productivity (percentage of total fund)	50	50	50
3. Norm for forming incentive fund for each percent of growth in labor productivity (percentage of material incentive fund)	$\frac{50}{110}=.454$	$\frac{50}{110}=.454$	$\frac{50}{110}=.454$
4. Percentage of total product of the highest category of quality (percentage)	5	25	85
5. Portion of incentive fund used to estimate norm for percentage of product of highest quality (percentage of total fund)	50	50	50
6. Norm for formation of incentive fund for each point of percentage of product of highest quality (percentage of incentive fund)	$\frac{50}{5}=10$	$\frac{50}{25}=2.$	$\frac{50}{85}=.59$

The table shows that for the A group of enterprises the norm for the indicator of quality exceeds the norm for labor productivity growth by 22 times, for the B group by 4.4 times and for the C group by 1.3-fold. Such correlations are unjustified. To eliminate such differences it is necessary for those groups of enterprises having a low percentage of total product of high quality to use a significantly smaller portion of the incentive fund for estimating this indicator as compared with those enterprises that have a high percentage of high quality product. As a result it will be possible to provide an approximately equal correlation between the norms for labor productivity and the percentage of total product of highest quality for various groups of enterprises.

It is entirely possible to construct a special table that demonstrates what share of the estimated incentive fund has to be used to determine norms for a certain percentage of highest quality product. It would look something like this:

Table 2

Percentage of product of highest quality from the total output	Portion of incentive fund used to stimulate (percentage of total amount)	
	For growth in labor productivity	For percentage of product of highest category of quality
0-10	90	10
10-20	85	15
20-30	80	20
30-40	75	25
40-50	70	30
50-60	65	35
60-70	60	40
70-80	55	45
80-90	50	50

Then in the cited example the norm for the quality indicator for the A group of enterprises would be 2 percent of the material incentive fund (10 : 5), and for growth in productivity - .82 percent (90 : 110); for B group .8 percent (20 : 25) and .73 percent (80 : 110), respectively; and for C group - .625 percent (50 : 80) and .454 (50 : 110). The differences in the relationship between the norms for the groups of enterprises would not be as sharp as shown previously using this method for estimating.

As noted the incentive funds are determined by norms in the five-year plan. Exceeding the assignments of the control figures is stimulated in an increased amount; and when the indicators are reduced against the control figures the incentive funds are decreased. It is necessary to emphasize that the material incentive fund must be increased, as a rule, within the limits of additional profit, called for in excess of the control figures.

When drafting annual plans according to increased norms there is an incentive to make counter plans, which exceed the assignments of the five-year plan, which are established for a given year. However, the norms are increased in a smaller amount than when exceeding the control figures. This prompts accepting of more taut assignments when compiling the five-year plan.

The procedure of deductions for the material incentive funds depending upon the actual plan fulfillment has not been changed substantially. It must be noted that to deduct the planned amount of money while fulfilling the fund-forming indicators requires that the profit plan also be fulfilled. The planned material incentive fund is adjusted in the appropriate period of time to the amount of the overfulfillment (underfulfillment) of the profit plan as a percentage. The norms will be used as a percentage of the actual profit obtained during the period of time that has passed from the start of the year.

In theoretical examples we shall demonstrate the differences in using the profit indicator with the actual deductions for the material incentive fund according to the new and existing systems.

Table 3 (in thousands of rubles)

	Planned incentive fund	Change in incentive fund by		Actual incentive fund		Deviation (+ or -)
		Overfulfillment (under fulfillment of profit plan	Overfulfillment (underfulfillment of fund forming indicators	Estimate by existing system	Estimate by new system	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I Profit plan fulfilled 100 %	100			100	100	
	100		+15	100	100	
	100		-15	85	85	
II Profit plan overfulfilled	100	+10	+ 5	105	115	+10
	100	+10		100	110	+10
	100	+10	- 5	95	105	+10
	100	+10	-10	90	100	+10
	100	+10	-15	85	95	+10
III Profit plan underfulfilled	100	-10	+ 5	100 *	95	- 5
	100	-10	+10	100 *	100	
	100	-10	+15	100 *	100 *	
	100	-10		100	90	-10
	100	-10	-10	90	80	-10

* Deductions are in planned amount due to lack of excess profit.

Table 3 shows that when the profit plan is fulfilled by 100 percent the deductions under the new system will be the same; but when the profit plan is overfulfilled the deductions are larger under the existing system in connection with any variations of fulfilling the fund-forming indicators. When the profit plan is underfulfilled the deductions will in the majority of cases be smaller. In some cases the deductions will be made, as under the existing system, in the planned amount.

In making the incentive funds directly dependent upon the obtained profit there is a considerable increase in the responsibility of the production associations (enterprises) to fulfill the profit plan. Now the underfulfillment of the profit plan results in a substantial reduction in the incentive funds. And on the contrary the production collectives have the opportunity to increase the incentive funds when overfulfilling the profit plan. This is a fair system because the receipt of additional profit is the result of more skilfull management and of raising production efficiency. It is only important that the profit be obtained by reducing production cost and by the additional output of product needed by the national economy and the population. As before, additional deductions into the incentive funds are made on the basis of and within the limits of excess profit within the established system for its distribution.

The dependence of the amount of the incentive fund upon fulfillment of the product delivery assignments is being strengthened. If the assignments and pledges for product deliveries are fulfilled in each quarter and as a cumulative total from the start of the year, the amount of the deductions can be increased to 10 percent at the expense of the reserve (centralized fund) of the ministry (industrial association). When the reserve is short, excess profit can be used.

Several new statutes deal with stimulating raising the quality of consumer goods; responsibility for the production of poor quality product will be strengthened. The labor collectives are given a great deal of independence in using incentive funds.

The current awarding of bonuses is provided primarily for improving qualitative indicators and for fulfilling assignments and pledges for product deliveries. The annual bonus is also to a large extent linked with the final results of production. It has been established that all remainders of cash cannot be used to pay the annual bonus according to other directives for their expenditure. Not less than 25 percent of the sums not used to pay bonuses or a current basis to management personnel, engineering and technical workers and employees will be paid into the reserve of a given production association (enterprise) and can be used in the following year.

The formation of the social and cultural activities and housing construction fund will, as now, be done at all stages in a determined percentage of the material incentive fund. It is established by the ministry within the limits of 30 to 50 percent considering how well the workers are provided with housing and social and cultural facilities.

Greater independence in the expenditure of funds has been extended; unwarranted regulation and detailed work have been eliminated. The new Basic Statutes no longer contain the order that no less than 60 percent of the planned sum of the fund must be used for the construction of housing and social and cultural facilities. Several other changes have been made.

In connection with the fact that the drawing up of the draft plans for the next year is done before approval of the five-year plans and that there are no stable norms for the formation of the incentive funds, the procedure for forming these funds in 1981 will differ somewhat from what is specified in the Basic Statutes. It is based on providing an incentive to exceed the annual average growth rates of labor productivity which were achieved in the Tenth Five-Year Plan and to exceed the profit obtained in the past five-year plan. There is also an incentive to exceed the 1980 planned indicator for the total percentage of product that is of highest quality. The size of the incentive fund, used to estimate the norms, will be increased in conformity to the growth of labor productivity according to the 1981 plan. In this manner from the very beginning of drafting the plan the ministries, associations and enterprises will be motivated to look for reserves to increase labor productivity. This makes it possible for them to receive higher norms and on their basis to form a bigger material incentive fund. When estimating the fund according to indicators which correspond to the average annual rates of their growth in the Tenth Five-Year Plan, and for quality - the percentage of product that is of the highest quality in the 1980 plan, approved norms are used. When there is a deviation from the 1981 indicators, increased (decreased) norms are used in accordance with the Basic Statutes.

Improving the system of forming and using incentive funds will promote a rise in production efficiency and the quality of work.

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MANPOWER PROBLEMS PUT IN MARXIST CONTEXT

Kiev EKONOMIKA SOVETSKOY UKRAINY in Russian No 10, Oct 80 pp 41-47

[Article by P. Paster, candidate of economic sciences: "Certain Aspects of the Reproduction of Manpower"]

[Text] Reproduction of man--society's principal productive force--is an organic part of expanded reproduction in all stages of the evolution and development of a mode of production. But in the context of advanced socialism, when full employment of the entire able-bodied population is established everywhere, reproduction of the human factor requires a specific and comprehensive solution.

The need for a comprehensive solution is brought about by objective causes in the country's socioeconomic development. Such sources of manpower as the household and private farming have been nearly exhausted. The share of persons brought into social production from the household and private farming has been dropping steadily: whereas it was 53 percent in the 1961-1965 period and 25 percent in the 1966-1970 period, in the 1971-1975 period it was only 1.5 percent.[1] We should note that the level of employment of the working population in the household and private farming varies from one economic region or union republic to another, but this does not change the situation as a whole.

Moreover, whereas up to the mid-sixties the USSR population was growing at rather high rates (the average annual growth in the 1959-1965 period was 1.5 percent), since the end of the sixties a sharp drop in that indicator has been observed (in the 1966-1969 period the population grew at an average annual rate of only 1 percent), in the 1970-1975 period the average annual rates of population growth were already below 1 percent. In 1976 and 1977 the average annual growth of the working-age population was 2.8-2.7 million persons, in 1978 it dropped to 2.2 million, in 1979 to 1.8 million and in 1980 it is expected to drop to 1.5 million persons.[2]

The decline of the birth rate over the last decade has brought about an ever increasing growth in the number of families with one and two children. Third, fourth and subsequent children at the present time already represent less than 25 percent of all births.[3] We thus observe a process of by and large reduced and simple reproduction of the population.

Our time is also characterized by an intensive aging of the population. For instance, between 1971 and 1980 more than 25 million workers, 9.5 million men and about 16 million women, will be leaving the working-age population.[4]

This means, first, that the increase in the number of workers employed in social production could be directly proportional to natural population growth in the present stage, and second, that additional needs for manpower in the sectors of the economy will be met mainly with people of one generation who as a rule have the same level of education, more or less the same intervals, etc. This factor will have a substantial impact on operation of the law of reproduction of manpower, tending to modify it and to expand the limits of the necessary product in line with the degree of increase of the needs of the direct producers.

But the socioeconomic situation is also complicated by certain other circumstances. To be specific, there is still a sizable share of manual labor and of heavy physical labor in particular in the sectors of the economy. According to figures of the USSR Central Statistical Administration, about 45 million persons were employed at unskilled manual labor in 1974. In industry the share of workers doing their work with machines and machinery increased from 40.3 percent in 1965 to 44.3 percent in 1972. Thus more than half of all the workers are still doing manual work. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that workers using tools in manual labor are included among workers whose jobs are mechanized.[5] Many of these jobs are done by people with elementary education. For instance, according to the 1970 population census, more than 67 percent of workers in such occupations as stokers, herdsmen, milkers, shepherds, stevedores, porters, hospital orderlies, nursemaids, and odd-jobmen have elementary education. They will be replaced by young workers with secondary education. New forms of the law of distribution according to work will have to be used to attract them to such jobs, since universal replacement of manual labor is a very complicated problem and solving it will take a long time.

The share of unskilled physical labor in auxiliary production is particularly substantial. Moreover, the growth rates of mechanization of auxiliary operations are lagging behind the growth rates of the principal operations themselves, which is explained by the distribution and utilization of capital investments: only 20 percent of the resources of enterprises allocated to mechanization are used to mechanize auxiliary process, and 80 percent goes for reequipping the principal production operation.[6] "However," Ye. L. Manevich notes, "from the standpoint of making manpower available capital investments to mechanize and automate auxiliary production are far more beneficial than those applied to the principal production operation; 1 million rubles spent to mechanize auxiliary processes makes 4-5-fold more workers available than investments in the principal production operation."[7]

Solving the problem of labor resources accordingly requires a further optimization of the policy of capital investments.

When new projects are being planned, there is also a need to make provision for technical-and-economic measures to reduce or even to completely eliminate unmechanized labor. In accordance with the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers entitled "On Improving Planning and Strengthening the Influence of the Economic Mechanism on Increasing Production Efficiency and Work Quality,"[8] in determination of the system of indicators which industrial ministries, associations and enterprises will be assigned in 5-year plans (in a breakdown by years) an assignment for reduction of the use of manual labor is being introduced as an indicator for the first time. Thus from now on the reduction of manual labor will be planned in proportions straightforwardly assigned for each year (quotas), which will put an end to unfounded delays of all sorts in this effort.

The country's economic development by intensive methods of the conduct of economic activity calls for expanded reproduction of manpower to take place primarily in an intensive way. "Expansion of the reproduction of manpower," M. Ya. Sonin writes, "is taking place extensively if its size increases without a change in the level of quality. A very important characteristic of predominantly intensive formation of manpower is a rise in its level of education and occupational skills, that is, its level of quality."[9]

Additional outlays are, of course, required for the intensive pattern of expanded reproduction of manpower. This is all the more important because the principal means of increasing the efficiency of social production is to raise labor productivity. The latter depends in turn on the rates of scientific-technical progress, capital investment policy, the quality of manpower, its optimum distribution and its effective use. For instance, according to calculations of scientists, the work of a worker who has secondary education is twice as productive as that of a worker with partial secondary education, and the work of a worker with higher education is threefold as productive as that of a worker with secondary education.[10]

Thus pursuit of the predominantly intensive method of the formation of manpower requires an expansion of the limits of the necessary product up to levels governed by the need for fuller satisfaction of the necessary needs of the workers, and this is ensured on the other hand by the level of development of society's productive forces that has been achieved. These relations are regulated by the law of reproduction of manpower, whose use calls for establishment of an optimum relationship (from the standpoint of achieving the goal of social production) between the manpower expended in the production process and the sum total of social conditions necessary for the normal level of reproduction of manpower.

Optimization of this relationship should provide the conditions necessary for reproduction of the relations of the universality of labor and for improvement of social ownership of the means of production and the products of labor. "The objective requirements for mandatory participation of every able-bodied man in social production are provided for under socialism," observe the authors of a monograph entitled "Sotsializm i narodnoye blagosostoyaniye" [Socialism and the Prosperity of the People], "by furnishing every member of society a job, opportunities to obtain education and skills and to constantly improve them, and by creating conditions for preserving the health of the workers."[11]

Yet, as we know, in socialism the conditions for applying and using labor are not the same from one sector of the economy to another or even within a single sector. There are various types of work depending on whether physical manual labor, mental labor, simple labor or complicated labor predominates. Workers are assigned to a particular type of work in accordance with their qualifications, and they remain in those jobs because of wage policy and various forms of financial and nonfinancial incentives. Consequently, working conditions, types of work, and the level of intensity of work provide for various levels of satisfaction of the needs of various groups of workers as a function of their place in the social process of production.

Thus society's manpower is reproduced on the basis of operation of the law of distribution according to work even from public consumption funds.

An important peculiarity of the reproduction of manpower in the context of mature socialism is that emphasis shifts from the predominantly quantitative aspect to the qualitative aspect. The reason is that at the present time progress in the production process itself is not possible unless the worker's personal attributes develop. "In socialist society," Ya. Gomberg notes, for example, "a man figures both as an independent agent carrying on planned economic activity, and also as a factor of the economy's development--an element of the productive forces. A two-way interconnection is achieved under these conditions: production has an effect on the individual's development, and the individual tends to improve production."[12]

In the production process proper a man figures not only as labor power, but also as one of the masters of social production. His needs increase on that basis. That means that the resources for satisfying those needs must increase. Equality between them is a necessary condition for improving a man's personal attribute and for his development as a worker, which in turn creates the need and the prerequisites for the further development of production.

Public consumption funds have tremendous importance in this connection. Society uses them for planned coverage of development of all the various abilities of every member of society on an equal basis. It is from public consumption funds that the public is provided free schooling and improvement of qualifications, free medical care, financial assistance, pensions, scholarships, paid annual vacations, free and reduced-rate vouchers to sanatoriums and rest homes, enrollment of children in preschool institutions, and so on. Payments and benefits which individuals receive from public consumption funds are increasing at a fast pace. In 1965 they amounted to 41.9 billion rubles in the country as a whole, 1970 they were 63.9 billion, and in 1978 they were 105.5 billion rubles.[13]

Reproduction of manpower is closely related to building the material and technical base of communism and to further development of scientific-technical progress. This means that at the present time socialist society needs trained workers who can run new and ever newer equipment based on electrification and automation of production and on the use of electronic computers. The present-day worker is coming closer and closer to engineering and technical personnel in his skills and his education. Moreover, the worker's present-day skills and level of sophistication are not constant: they are changing together with the change in present-day technology, science and production. The system for training skilled personnel should always have three moving reference points before it: the structure and location of production, development of scientific-technical progress and demographic factors. The production structure changes under the impact of the development of the scientific-technical revolution and satisfaction of society's needs, which are related to the emergence of new production operations and new production complexes and also to changes in the distribution of labor among the CEMA member-countries.

Building the material and technical base of communism above all enhances requirements for machinebuilding, which decides the success of all sectors of the economy. That is why the 25th CPSU Congress called for the output of machinebuilding to increase more than 1.5-fold in the 10th Five-Year Plan. The structure of machinebuilding will improve at the same time. Greater attention is being paid to the development of machine tool building, instrumentmaking, and the electrical equipment and electronics industries. The drafting of large-scale comprehensive programs covering between two and four 5-year periods is taking on ever greater importance. All of this makes it necessary to train the needed personnel, especially highly skilled personnel, in the context of the scientific-technical revolution and the strain on the balance of labor resources.

Level of Education of Workers Performing Physical and Mental Work (per 1,000 members of the respective population groups who have higher and secondary (complete and partial) education)

	1939	1959	1970	1977
Population employed in the national economy	123	433	653	780
Workers performing predominantly physical labor	44	322	540	700
Workers performing predominantly mental labor	512	892	952	970

Source: "SSSR v tsifrakh v 1977 godu" [USSR in Figures in 1977], p 17.

A very important factor in this context is the growth of highly skilled manpower capable of performing complicated work, which to a considerable degree will cover the drop in the growth of the working population (see the table).

Thus the number of employees in the national economy with higher and secondary education increased 6.2-fold between 1939 and 1977, the number employed in predominantly physical labor increased nearly 16-fold, and the number employed in predominantly mental labor increased less than twofold. USSR VUZ's are now graduating fivefold more engineers annually than those of the United States, and the number of graduate engineers employed in the sectors of the USSR national economy is 2.5-fold greater.[14]

As was emphasized at the 25th CPSU Congress, the main way to solve the problem of labor resources is to speed up the mechanization and automation of labor. Labor productivity rises on this basis, and workers employed at semiskilled and manual labor become available. Other very important factors are specialization of production, improvement of the organization of work and the management of production, the fight against downtime and underemployment of productive capital, introduction of technically sound output quotas and standard service zones, progressive forms of remuneration, development of socialist competition, and so on.

Much attention is being paid to creating servomechanisms. The era of robots has already begun. As I. Makarov remarks, the industrial robot is a multilink mechanical arm whose movements are guided by a computing device that is usually electronic.[15] Industrial robots can in many cases replace human beings; they make it possible to mechanize and automate work at heavy and harmful jobs. The task will soon arise of turning over to robots a number of operations in construction and agriculture. The problem of building underwater robots for use in developing the natural resources of the ocean is becoming more and more urgent. Industrial robots and their control are improving all the time. The time has come to work on the problem of building robots which have technical vision and can sense contact. At the present time the world has more than 13,000 industrial robots. More than 1,000 general-purpose and specialized industrial robots have been made in our country over the last 3 years. The need for them in the USSR will be 26,000 units by 1980 and will exceed 100,000 in the not-so-distant future.[16]

Thus the society of mature socialism has commenced gigantic transformations in the domain of the productive forces. Particular attention is now being paid in the USSR to the automation of production. In the industrial sector there were 22,400 fully mechanized and automated sections, shops and production operations as of 1 July 1965, 66,200 in 1975 and 74,400 in 1977; by the same respective dates the number of mechanized flowlines was 42,900, 114,100 and 125,800.[17]

The use of electronic computers in production, control and management is particularly important: "Electronic computers installed in technological systems all the way down to individual machines and also in industrial trucks are automating and improving the entire cycle of operations of production and transport systems. They are also becoming the material foundation of the future information industry, which is taking shape at a fast pace at the present time."[18]

Progressive technology is taking on ever greater importance. For example, continuous casting of steel is making gigantic blooming mills unnecessary, new welding methods are replacing the old ones, which required cumbersome machines, and so on.[19]

New technology and production methods and their development are imposing higher requirements on the quality of manpower. It is now becoming a mandatory condition for further successful development of production, engineering and technology that the worker have specialized knowledge, high skills and sophistication.

In the Belorussian SSR, for example, by the end of 1980 industrial and agricultural collectives will by and large be replenished with graduates of vocational and technical schools--specialists with secondary education and high skills.[20]

It would seem that new technology, mechanization of labor and highly skilled personnel would automatically promote an absolute decrease in the number of workers in the country. Yet experience does not confirm this. Mechanization and automation of production have the result that the total mass of commodities grows in enormous proportions, and the need for raw materials, the means of labor and fuel grow accordingly. All of this necessitates expansion of production in other sectors and the creation of new production operations. So, though machines actually do make workers available in those industries where they are applied, at the same time they bring about an increase of employment in other sectors of the economy.

To a certain extent the tendency toward an absolute increase in the number of employees can be offset by a regular rise in production efficiency. V. I. Lenin showed in schemes of expanded socialist reproduction that stepping up the rates of economic growth under socialism, in contrast to capitalism, occurs thanks to higher efficiency achieved on the basis of intensification of production.[21]

Scientific organization of work, production specialization and other organizational and economic measures have great importance to labor saving. Scientific organization of production and work, optimum location of the productive forces, specialization of enterprises and the sectors of the economy, operation according to schedule and monitoring conformity to the schedule will create a large potential for conservation and proper use of manpower. "It is only thanks to well-thought-out and scientifically sound specialization of production," Ye. Manevich writes, "that it is possible to make several million workers, engineers and employees available."[22]

High work efficiency depends not so much on the number of employees (here there should always be an optimum) as on the quality, training, political education and assignment of workers, and this depends to a considerable degree on production managers who know how to organize the job and to have a beneficial effect on the workers. L. I. Brezhnev notes in his book "Vozrozhdeniye" [Revival] that he always prized more than anything else people's persistence, independence of thought, confidence, keen sense for the new, and the ability to note and support the initiative and creativity of the masses in good time.[23]

Veterans of labor are also an additional manpower reserve. We should not forget that our country has 46 million people who are receiving pensions and are not working. They include many who are able and willing to work. After all, doing something useful would not only bring the pensioners additional material goods, but also a great deal of spiritual and physical satisfaction, and it would tend to improve their physical condition and morale. Social security agencies might study the desires of veterans of labor as to where and when various groups among them would be able and willing to work. It might even be possible to set up certain small new production operations based on these reserves of manpower. Society would obtain an enormous amount of goods needed by consumers. This was precisely the purpose of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers entitled "On Financial Incentives To Encourage Pensioners To Work in the National Economy."

Consequently, this problem awaits an energetic solution. The instruction of the 25th CPSU Congress concerning the need to use old-age pensioners and certain groups of disabled persons has still not been altogether carried out.

A sizable saving of the population's work time lies in self-service. Economists have calculated that at the present time self-service and housework amount to about 150 billion man-hours a year in the entire country. Development of the sphere of consumer service makes it possible to cut those expenditures in half. As a result the free time available to the country's workers would increase by approximately 70-75 billion man-hours per year.[24]

Development of health care is also very important to saving on work time. According to the calculations of S. G. Strumilin, over a quarter of a century (1940-1965) improvement of the health system in the USSR has made it possible to save our society about 94 million man-years of working life of people up to age 60. Moreover, outlays for health care prove to be very effective: over the 25-year period about 250 years of labor were saved for every physician. Preservation of such a large amount of live labor saved society about 220 rubles of national income for every 100 rubles spent in the field of health.[25]

Socialist reproduction is to solve the ongoing problem of ensuring the universality of labor. In socialism there should not be anyone who is not employed in socially useful labor. The USSR Constitution states that only "socially useful labor and its results shall determine a man's position in society." Work under socialism is not only one of the bases of the national wealth, but also a source for development of a man's personality. Under communism "work activity ceases to be only a means to life and becomes authentic creativity and a source of joy."[26]

Providing every worker an appropriate job demands that society make certain outlays to prepare the work station. For instance, in 1972 the average cost of a work station in the industrial sector of the USSR was 15,900 rubles. The average monthly wage of production personnel proper was 142.1 rubles. Consequently, in 1972 it was necessary to spend 10,018.8 million rubles just to provide jobs for those beginning to work in industrial production.[27] Of course these outlays are repaid in full, but in order to make them society must have the corresponding resources, resources which it creates through socialist accumulation. Socialist accumulation, which is accomplished primarily by virtue of the additional product, signifies a growth of society's national resources and a rise of the social productivity of labor on the one hand, and on the other a rise in the standard of living of the workers. The greater the resources of society, their size and rate of growth, the more fully the needs of the members of society are satisfied and the more fully they develop in every way.

"The law of socialist accumulation is organically related in its operation to operation of the law of socialist population, whose most important features are the following: rapid population growth, full and optimum use of its able-bodied portion, a steady rise in the level of physical well-being of the people, and low morbidity and mortality rates of the population."[28]

One of the intrinsic peculiarities of socialist reproduction is the training of skilled personnel, retraining and improvement of qualifications. Training and retraining of personnel moreover take into account the advances of scientific-technical progress and future needs for skilled personnel.

In 1976 the country's vocational and technical schools alone trained 2.11 million skilled workers. Over the entire period from 1941 to 1978 they trained 39 million skilled workers.[29] Workers are being trained and are improving their qualifications at enterprises and in institutions at a rapid pace and on a large scale. For instance, the number of workers going through training to improve their qualifications at enterprises was 21.6 million in 1978.[30]

The number of the most skilled workers, who meet the requirements of present-day technology, is growing at a particularly fast pace. For example, the number of machine tool and automatic machine setupmen increased 2.3-fold between 1959 and 1972. Substantial shifts are taking place in the occupational composition of construction workers, especially those attending machines and machinery. For instance, while the total number of construction workers increased 34 percent between 1965 and 1972, the number of bulldozer operators increased 81 percent and the number of excavator operators 76 percent.[31]

The problem of balancing the physical and personal factors of production is very important. Correlation of the physical and personal factors includes both the quantitative and qualitative aspects: "Correlation of physical and personal factors is characterized by quantitative and qualitative aspects. The qualitative aspect is expressed in the following under the conditions of advanced socialism: existence of a stable balance between the number of jobs and also the number of jobs added, on the one hand, and the number of workers actually employed in productive activity; providing jobs to the entire able-bodied population drawn into the production process, which arises out of the universality and compulsory nature of work under socialism. Qualitative correlation ensures on the one hand the production of manpower which in its distribution by vocations and skills corresponds to the distribution of jobs on the other, jobs which in their technical level correspond to the growing demands of the work force as to the content of labor."[32] The sphere of application of the most highly qualified labor is expanding rapidly at the present time; the demand for this kind of labor is not yet being fully satisfied, and this holding back activation of capacities. According to the data of a survey conducted by RSFSR labor agencies, 67 percent of enterprises activated in 1978 were not furnished skilled workers in the principal occupations. In the country's industry and construction output quotas are not being met to a considerable extent because the level of qualifications of more than 1 million piece-rate workers are not high enough.[33] Consequently, we need to train workers who are professionals in line with the prospects for development of the scientific-technical revolution and specifically in accordance with the development of the physical factors of production. At the same time everything should be done to encourage workers to master occupations and to combine them. The decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers entitled "On Improving Planning and Strengthening the Influence of the Economic Mechanism on Increasing Production Efficiency and Work Quality" (July 1979) has stated that production associations (enterprises) are being extended the right to pay staff members supplements to wage rates for mastering their occupation and for combining occupations.

FOOTNOTES

1. VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, No 8, 1978, p 53.

2. "Trudovyye resursy. Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskiy analiz" [Labor Resources. A Socioeconomic Analysis], Moscow, Ekonomika, 1976, p 21; VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, No 8, 1978, p 5.

3. PRAVDA, 2 April 1979.

4. "Trudovyye resursy...," p 93.

5. VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, No 8, 1978, p 42.

6. Ibid., p 43.

7. Ibid.

8. PRAVDA, 29 July 1979.

9. "Ekonomicheskaya effektivnost' obshchestvennogo proizvodstva v period razvitogo sotsializma" [Economic Efficiency of Social Production in the Period of Advanced Socialism], Moscow, Nauka, 1979, p 239.

10. "Nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revolyutsiya i obshchestvo" [The Scientific-Technical Revolution and Society], Moscow, Mysl', 1973, p 247.

11. "Sotsializm i narodnoye blagosostoyaniye" [Socialism and the Prosperity of the People], Moscow, Mysl', 1976, p 141.

12. Gomberg, Ya., "The Necessary Product in the Socialist Context," VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, No 5, 1978, p 15.

13. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1978 g." [Soviet National Economy in 1978], Moscow, Statistika, 1979, p 390.

14. Khachaturov, T. S., "Sovetskaya ekonomika na sovremennom etape" [The Soviet Economy in the Present Stage], Moscow, Mysl', 1975, p 142.

15. Makarov, I., "Robots: Today and Tomorrow," PRAVDA, 30 August 1979.

16. Ibid.

17. "SSSR v tsifrakh v 1978 g." [The USSR in Figures in 1978], p 77.

18. Kheynman, S., "The Scientific-Technical Revolution and the Structure of Social Production," VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, No 8, 1978, p 85.

19. Kheynman, S., op. cit., p 87.

20. PRAVDA, 17 September 1978.

21. "Leninskiy sbornik XXXVIII" [Lenin Collection 38], Politizdat, 1975, pp 89-91.

22. Manevich, Ye., "Reproduction of the Population and Use of Labor Resources," VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, No 8, 1978, p 43.

23. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom. Rechi, privetstviya, stat'i, vospominaniya" [On Lenin's Course. Speeches, Salutations, Articles and Memoirs], Vol 7, Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp 109-110.

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25. Strumilin, S. G., "On the Efficiency of Health Care From the Standpoint of the National Economy," EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI, No 5, 1966, p 30.

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27. EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI, No 2, 1976, p 73.

28. "Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" [Large Soviet Encyclopedia], Vol 33, 2d edition, Moscow, 1955, p 586.

29. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1978 g.," p 380.

30. Ibid., p 382.

31. Brizgalov, V., "Golovna produktivna sila suspil'sdtva," Kiev, Politvidav Ukrayini, 1977, pp 84-85.

32. Moskovich, V., and Anan'yev, V., "Distribution of Workers by Vocation and Skills," VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, No 6, 1979, p 55.

33. Ibid., pp 57, 58.

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LABOR

GOSPLAN EXECUTIVE URGES JOURNALISTS TO PROMOTE STRONGER DISCIPLINE

Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 30-32

[Article by Yevgeniy Voronin, deputy chief of the division of labor of USSR Gosplan: "Why Do Violations of Labor Discipline Occur?"]

[Text] The October 1980 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee mentioned shortcomings in work alongside such factors as bad weather conditions and the depletion of traditional sources of raw material as retarding our rate of economic growth.

This is also noted in the draft document of the CPSU Central Committee for the 26th party congress, entitled "Basic Directions of Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and the Period until 1990": "The mechanism of management and planning, methods of economic activity, and level of labor and performance discipline have fallen below contemporary requirements. This has made the economic transition to intensive development more difficult."

Performance discipline is a broad and multifaceted concept. It means more than just discipline during the performance of particular operations at the workplace, which is how it is often interpreted. It also means discipline in the performance of state plans and discipline in maintaining economic ties, an intricate system of production and economic relationships within a sector or in the intersectorial and interregional spheres of labor.

The system of production and economic ties encompasses virtually every enterprise, large or small. But when performance discipline is poor at some point and assignments envisioned by the plan are not met, schedules are set back, volumes decline, and quality diminishes; the break in rhythm at one enterprise is passed along to others as if by living nerves. These breaks make themselves known in everyday life by the sudden disappearance of laundry soap, electric light bulbs, or tooth brushes from the stores. But those "disappearances" that are concealed to outsiders, that take place in production itself, are much more important than the visible breakdowns; it is like comparing a machine tool or tractor with a tooth brush in significance.

The rhythm of labor is disrupted and losses of work time increase. And certainly we all know how the price of each working minute is rising with the growth in labor productivity.

Therefore, the concept of performance discipline also encompasses the meaning that we include in production discipline, labor discipline, and technological discipline. But beyond this it means teamwork in the interactions of enterprises and sectors and precision in the most complicated spheres of material-technical supply. Mutual deliveries, supply of raw materials and assembly components, energy supply, and transportation services — all these things come together in plans, of course. They also come together in real life. As long as performance discipline is good it insures precise performance of every duty of the sector, the production collective, and the individual employee.

This seems to be elementary. But why is it necessary more and more to talk about the low level of performance discipline? Why is it becoming a special problem? I could name various causes that have been pointed out in the press many times. Among them are shortcomings in planning work and calculations by numbers of ministries which sometimes work very poorly together. I must single out as a special factor the decline in responsibility on the part of workers. I will discuss here two problems which, in my opinion, are becoming especially important today. The first is performance discipline and fulfillment of the plan; the second is discipline and the scarcity of labor. I think this matter deserves more detailed discussion.

The plan is the foundation of our life. It is adopted at sessions of the Supreme Soviet as the law on the plan of economic and social development for the particular segment of time. And it must be carried out as a law, without wavering or compromise, by everyone without exception, from the worker to the manager.

But a tolerant attitude toward failure to fulfill the plan has appeared from somewhere and, to judge by many items in the press, has taken root. People say it is bad, but not fatal! I wonder if certain employees of the press have not helped reinforce these views. From the very best motives, I am sure, they pit the vital, creative spirit against the bureaucratic spirit and support initiative, boldness, and an ardent spirit but how many times certain journalists have permitted themselves to speak with disrespect of the holy of holies of the socialist economy: the plan! How many caustic references there have been to workers who have done something unnecessary or not done something essential "for the sake of the plan!"

I saw a letter recently received by the editors of ZHURNALIST. The author had run into the expression "unconditional fulfillment of the plan" in his oblast newspaper. It confused him a little and so he asked for an explanation: Is there such a thing as "non-unconditional" fulfillment? Can fulfillment be somehow "conditional"? and then, is it worth planning if some condition or other will not permit the plan to be carried out?

I myself have encountered such expressions in newspapers and magazines. Once I even read in a newspaper that "obligations to fulfill the plan" had been adopted somewhere. The author of the story reported it without the slightest irony, even approvingly.

It is a distinctive feature of performance discipline, if we look at the plan and its fulfillment from this standpoint, that it must be observed by every element of the complex chain without exception, from the management to the production level. If not, it is violated.

Exacting higher standards of workers at all levels and in all elements is, in my view, becoming the order of the day. If the plan is law, then accountability for its fulfillment should be just as strict as for violation of any other law. It seems to me that this idea does not resound in the press as it should. Perhaps there is reason to draw attention to every case of failure to fulfill the plans? To carefully analyze and single out the objective reasons for failure to fulfill (which can also occur) from someone's lack of diligence. And then, after clarifying everything, hold those at fault to the strictest account.

But what if the plan is overfulfilled? Does this convince us that everything is fine with performance discipline at the particular enterprise? It seems to me that there should also be a sober, critical approach to cases of overfulfillment. It is interesting and useful to establish how they were able to overfulfill plan assignments, how smoothly the subdivisions worked, and how realistic and demanding the plan was. Are there disproportions between the labor of the leaders who perform two, three, and sometimes more plan assignments in one year and the labor of the slow and mediocre workers who barely meet their quotas? Why do they "barely make it"? Is it lack of desire, ability, or necessary conditions?

I am aware that it is difficult for a journalist to get to the heart of a breakdown. Violations of performance discipline may be in the open and "leap out at you"; they may also be concealed and require that the reporter be well informed about production affairs. For example, if start-up times have passed and the enterprise is still not built, it is impossible not to notice. But it is much more difficult to establish that an enterprise which was launched on schedule and began producing output does not reach projected capacity within the set times. Why is this? Among the various reasons that do not lie on the surface I will mention just one very typical one: the management of the enterprise failed to take care of timely training of skilled operations workers.

Everyone knows that the work force for a new enterprise must be trained while construction is still working at ground level. The management must consider exactly what kind of specialists will be needed, how many of them, and what sources are available to form the work force. It will be necessary to retrain some of the freed construction workers and open up vocational-technical schools and training combines ahead of time. Thought must be given to where the workers will live, how they will spend their free time, and where they will educate their children.

But how often this is not done! Construction of the enterprise is completed and...it stands idle. The managers come to higher offices, to us at Gosplan, absolutely demanding that we give them workers! Reassign graduates from the vocational-technical schools, they demand! But if we did that, it would be taking away from those enterprises who were assigned workers under the plan. Is that fair?

According to the rules, the ministry and its executives are responsible for recruiting skilled workers for an enterprise. But I have not heard that anybody has been truly responsible for the lack of trained workers. If a shop is not launched on time, there will be punishment, very strict punishment. If a vocational-technical school or training combine is not completed on schedule, they will get a "slap on the wrist." The attitude toward those who disregard the construction of nursery schools, sports facilities, and clubs is even more complacent.

So what happens is the following. The walls go up, the equipment is installed, all reports are signed on time, and even bonuses are distributed. But there are no workers. The plan, however, works from the projected capacity of the enterprise. Those who wrote the plan are already manipulating its output. It is distributed ahead of time and the work of other enterprises is regulated counting on it. This is a very obvious and, unfortunately, quite typical example of violation of performance discipline.

Let me bring up one more aspect of performance discipline. When speaking of the problems of labor resources, and generally about everything involving regular workers, newspaper people put a paragraph or two in the article about the shortage of labor. If a doctor cannot figure out why you are sick, he enters in the case history the familiar "common cold." If a person sees problems with staffing an enterprise, he writes "labor shortage."

Doctor of economic sciences V. Kostyakov, writing in ZHURNALIST No 6, 1980, proved convincingly, in my opinion, that this problem is largely imaginary, at least in the form sometimes served up in the press. We will indeed have to live through a period of slowdown in the rate of natural growth of able-bodied population, but this time has not even arrived yet. The 10th Five-Year Plan was the best in the postwar period in terms of influx of labor. But the talk about the shortage has been carried on persistently for at least three or four years now! Let me recall, incidentally, that in the early 1960's when natural growth was lower than in the late 1970's, no such shortage was felt at all. Some small cities even had difficulties with job placement.

So if you find a specific situation where the plan was not fulfilled and obligations were violated, do not be in a hurry to say the magic word. Try to dig a little deeper for the causes. It may turn out that the problem at a lagging enterprise is not shortage of labor but something else. Perhaps working time is simply used inefficiently (at certain enterprises up to 15 percent of shift time is lost) or large doses of manual labor are used. It may be found that the enterprise managers are neglecting the working and living conditions of their employees, and this has a strong impact on both labor productivity and worker mobility.

(Let me observe, incidentally, that millions of workers are traveling from place to place every day. It has also been calculated that setting up in a new place takes as much as 30 days.)

In short, the "labor shortage" to which journalists refer can often be explained by shortcomings in the economic mechanism and in management. And

I believe it is simply harmful to write about any fatal causes of shortcomings (even if the necessary number of workers had not been born, this would just be something we must work with). By writing in this way we are forgiving poor managers for their sins ahead of time, above all for poor performance discipline.

Debates on important economic topics, one of them being the topic of labor, have become popular in the press recently. They involve a broad range of people in the discussion. Opinions clash, and it is especially good that sometimes the newspaper forum helps to find a common language between different departments. If the problem chosen for discussion is a real one, not "picked out of the sky," concrete, practical proposals come in from all sides.

But sometimes the articles published, even in respected publications, introduce more confusion than clarity in what are already complex situations. Recently, for example, readers were offered a review of the question of whether the shortage of labor is useful. For a long time the conflicting voices went back and forth: useful, or not useful. The only thing I can say is that some of the authors, to judge by everything, do not have a very good idea of what a labor shortage is, what a grave illness it is for the economy. This is the only reason that they could permit themselves to play with verbal paradoxes. An equally successful debate could be held on the subject of whether smoking is useful. It would probably be possible to find a point of view which says that smoking is not so bad.

Of course, material in the newspaper is not official instructions. Different, sometimes mutually exclusive voices should be heard in the press. Some costs are inevitable in polemics. As I understand it, newspaper people want to stimulate the initiative of the readers by their stark and unexpected ways of formulating issues. But in my opinion, the organizers of a debate must be absolutely clear from the very beginning, or even before the beginning, as to the purposes of the debate. Why is it being undertaken, and what are the goals?

In this connection I would like to say that while we have begun to use the word "shortage" to scare one another, we still are not always taking a very business-like attitude toward preparing for the significant decline in natural population growth that in fact awaits us in the coming decade. Vague, general discussions of incomplete [less than full] employment and possible types of home labor are frequently conducted. For example, the newspapers have on several occasions carried suggestions that steps be taken to keep pensioners on the job. But in this case too, the objectives of the debate are not just to set forth the idea and have a general discussion about it. In my opinion, everything should be thought through more thoroughly and concretely: what jobs would it be wise for elderly people to hold, and under what production conditions? What restriction must be strictly followed in view of their age? But for some reason, specialists in labor and medicine and responsible representatives of the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and the USSR Ministry of Health have not been taking part in the discussion of these problems. As a result, there have not been any concrete proposals yet.

Better use of labor and stepping up the mechanization and automation of production is another key problem in straightening out performance discipline.

I think that journalists could be very helpful here too. If I were a newspaper man, I would honestly do the following. When I saw a young man with a shovel, I would go to the enterprise director, to the ministry, to Gosplan, asking what is going on. And I am confident that I would find my way to those deeper causes that are seldom mentioned in newspaper articles. The problem of reducing the use of manual labor has enormous economic and also social significance. In our RSFSR industry today, for example, more than 40 percent of all workers are engaged in manual labor, and in construction it is about 58 percent.

Capital investment money for mechanization and automation has been released. Every enterprise has a development fund. Special-purpose loans can be obtained. Then what is the problem? Who is at fault for the fact that workers with secondary education, from whom so much can be expected, are employed in hapless, unattractive, primitive labor? Is it the Ministry of Construction, Road, and Municipal Machine Building, the ones who are responsible for producing the machines that are expected to replace human labor? Or is it the economic managers who are not persistent and consistent enough in introducing and using machinery? I am confident that low performance discipline is also one of the main reasons.

There is one more question related to this problem. This is the efficiency of help given by the city to the countryside, by industrial enterprises to agriculture.

The central and local press have observed many times already that certain plants keep "surplus" workers, figuring that they will inevitably be "enlisted" for agricultural work. Sometimes the conclusion drawn from this is that we should put an end to such "enlistments." But this is unrealistic and incorrect. Help by the city for the countryside has been and remains essential. What we need is to organize it wisely and correctly.

When we send, for example, 100 workers to a kolkhoz, nobody can give a good reason why it is precisely 100, not 50 or 200. No one makes special calculations and no one is responsible if there is no work for them when they arrive. No one is upset that the labor activism of rural workers is declining noticeably. Their discipline is declining also. But there is a useful practice that has been developed in many places. A plant and a kolkhoz formed contract obligations which stipulate precisely what each party is responsible for and what the sanctions are for breaching the contract. Then it becomes obvious that it is not profitable to use helpers from the city in every job. Skilled lathe and milling machine operators are just ordinary workers when they dig potatoes, but if they work with the farm machinery they prove very useful. This kind of help really promotes progress in agriculture, and the urban enterprise will not have to be clever and keep extra workers either.

In this example it is easy to see the close interrelationship of performance discipline and the labor shortage, both in the city and the countryside.

The firm resolve of the party to strengthen discipline in all elements of the national economy is finding broad support. The campaign to raise performance discipline will increasingly attract the attention of journalists and readers. Therefore, the development of this topic must be approached as one would approach a long-term, multifaceted program of action.

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11,176
CSO: 1828

LABOR PRODUCTIVITY DECREASES DURING NIGHT SHIFTS

Moscow SOVESTSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Nov 80 p 2

[Article: "The Third Shift"]

[Text] The level of organization of modern production is largely characterized by the shift index. Its increase at enterprises and construction sites throughout the Russian Federation promises many million rubles' worth of additional output with simultaneous possibilities of also reducing capital investments by immense sums. But extremely little advantage is being taken of this powerful reserve for increasing production efficiency. Moreover, in a number of branches of industry and in construction there is a reduction of the shift index.

. . . A large beacon burns high in the sky on a construction crane, but the crane itself is immobile. Why? There is a somnolent twilight throughout the shop and the machine tools have fallen silent. Why? The work proceeds, but it is chilly and uncomfortable for those who have come today for the third shift. Things are not going well. And again, why?. . .

The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA inspection brigades visited many enterprises in various cities of the Russian Federation. They revealed a number of factors that give rise to serious disagreements on the third and even on the second shifts. The participants in the inspection noted above all the poor supply of these shifts with parts, instruments and batching components. Here is the picture that is typical of several subdivisions of the Kuzbasselektromotor Production Association.

Machine assembly shop No. 4. It is the beginning of the second shift but the people are not coming into the shop, but . . . they are leaving it. They are returning home as though they had never come to work. The master N. Gerasimova explains: "Eighteen people have come for the second shift but no more than thirteen will work. And even they will only work if the necessary parts come in. Yesterday the second shift did not work at full force."

The situation is no better in the neighboring assembly shop No. 7. The work is actually in progress only in section No. 72 where starters are manufactured.

"Yes, we are busy today," affirmed the master A. Karmanov. "The fact is that four people were supposed to work in the section. But only three came and one of them is a student. I'm afraid that we shall hold up the fitters."

The group of workers who had left the fourth shop came to mind. Probably one of them would have wanted to help his neighbors.

The conversation with the chief of shop No. 4, I. Korchuganov, was not a happy one. He confirmed that essentially two out of four sections are idle. Measures are now being taken to speed up the receipt of parts. But still some of the people had to be let go. And those who remain will not have a full load.

What happens in the assembly shops bear witness to the unfavorable situation in the enterprise as a whole. The deputy director of the association, A. Laptev, said that from the standpoint of production there should be no differences between shifts. The facts, however, show that the difference is there and it is quite marked. Apparently correct theorectical views can not be coordinated with this extremely unsatisfactory practice.

At the Irkutsk Heavy Machine Building Plant imeni V. V. Kuybyshev they also say justifiably that the success of the work on the third shift depends directly on all kinds of preparation for it. These are the words. But what about the deeds? The boring machine operator, G. Kolosovskiy, and other machine operators referred to the constant shortage of instruments. They are poorly prepared for those who come on the night shift. This makes it more difficult to fulfill assignments and dampens the peoples' spirits.

In the third shop, the shift is small--there were only ten people at the machines on the day of the inspection. Another twelve--masters, crane operators and an instrument worker--were responsible for providing for the labor productivity. But the people worked with interruptions. Precisely herein lies the main reason for the fact that machine operators do not wish to work on the third shift.

The inspectors devoted special attention to the organization of 24-hour work at construction sites. Is it possible to build during the night? Practice has recently given a positive answer to this question. Construction and assembly operations can be carried out successfully at any time of the day at many construction sites. We are speaking about how best to organize construction on the third shift. Why does idle time usually occur most frequently at night?

One of the residential compounds that is being constructed most intensively, the Novo-Yuzhniy, is in Cheboksary. In the eighth microrayon, for example, SMU-103 of the housing construction combine is erecting a 108-apartment residential building. When the inspectors arrived at the construction site during the peak of the third shift, the team of A. Solo'yev's brigade had completed the assembly of blocks for the fourth floor.

"We must work with constant caution," said one of the assembly workers, "there is always something lacking. Today we should be covering the fourth floor. But it is still not clear what we are supposed to use to do this: so far we have no covering slabs. The section master, V. Silov, explained: "The parts were ordered on time but we do not know when they will appear at the construction site. They promised to ship them sometime after 1:00 a.m."

"And if they do not come?"

"Then we ourselves will have to go to the housing construction combine and decide on the spot what to do next. If worst comes to worst we will do some minor jobs."

There is no doubt that they will find something to do at the construction site. But can this kind of production organization be considered normal? Hardly. The results of last month are eloquent testimony to this: the plan was not fulfilled. The shift assignment is constantly under the threat of not being carried out. This is probably why certain administrations of housing construction combines do not even issue clear cut assignments for the third shift.

At another of the city's construction sites SMU-102 is constructing a 180-apartment building. At night there were only three people here. Neither the workers themselves nor the master could say precisely what they were supposed to be doing. Everything depended on the arrival of parts. But since there was only one truck available there were frequent cases of extended amounts of idle time. During the past week, for example, almost half of the shift remained idle each night.

Thus, in additional to interruptions in the delivery of materials, there is poor labor organization on the third shift in the working positions as well. This misfortune is typical of many enterprises. And it can not be explained by any "ministerial omissions." It is all a matter of the sluggishness and the inability of the management of enterprises, and sometimes also a lack of desire to arrange productive work on all shifts. There is no need to speak about the fact that it is more difficult to work on the third shift than on the first or that this labor has its own specific features for a person which must be taken into account. Special attention should be paid to those who come to work on the third shift.

The manager of the combined brigade of the walking excavator, honored miner of the RSFSR, Yu. Chemesov, was assigned to the third shift at the Cheremkhovskiy coal mine. He and the other miners had to wait a long time at the bus stop for a bus. There is no need to prove that this waiting does not create a good mood. The bus--old and rattling--came a half hour late. It was cold inside and the exhaust fumes made their eyes smart.

"It is never any differenc for us," say the miners with disgust. Both to work and back home--late. The directors rent the busses from the Cheremkhovskiy passenger automotive transportation enterprise. The vehicles frequently are sent out in bad repair. During the summer they are dusty and in the winter a freezing wind blows through them.

On this night the miners were late to work at other sections of the Cheremkhovskiy basin of the Vostsibugol' production association as well.

Chemesov's brigade worked hard. There were no breakdowns or disagreements that night. But when lunchtime came they had to be satisfied with dry food. For three years now the workers' supply department and the mine trade union have been trying to arrange to have hot food delivered to the mining face. They try and try, but nothing happens. . .

These are only individual instances, but they adequately characterize the level of concern for people working on the third shift. This is the way the problem was presented in a discussion of participants in the inspection in Kirov. It concerned the Krasnaya Zvezda match factory of the USSR Ministry of the Timber and Wood Processing Industry. Half of the factory's lines and automated machines are inoperative. In the assembly shop, for example, ten out of the twenty packing machines and fifteen of the 29 automatic labeling machines have not been turned on. The situation is the same in the hulling and automated machine shops and in the filler division.

What is the matter?

"There are not enough people," explains the master of the shop for automated match machines, G. Starodumova.

No, there are not enough. During the past ten years the number of workers at the enterprise has decreased by more than one-third. And the administration has in no way succeeded in making up for the shortage of working hands. But why are the people leaving? Because the enterprise which was a leading one in the past has come to a halt in its social development at the level achieved many years ago. Residential buildings have not been constructed for more than ten years. Because of the shortage of workers, one-third of the equipment is regularly not used to capacity. The conclusion emerges of its own accord: in places where there is no concern for people and attention is not devoted to the social development of the enterprise, the problem of maximum loading of equipment and high production efficiency is not solved.

In conclusion we have the report from the participants in the inspection at the Izhevsk housing construction combine. Here the picture is different. The enterprise plays a leading role in the construction conveyor of the capital of Udmurtiya, and its shops create structures and parts for three out of every four buildings constructed in the city. During the past 15 years there has not yet been an instance where it has not met the quarterly plan for any indicator.

This success of the combine's manager is related to many factors, including to the fact that the enterprise strives to maintain a regular work rhythm on all three shifts. Regardless of the time of day at which one brigade or another has occasion to take the watch, it is not indicated in the collective's indicators. All shifts have equal conditions, whether it concerns supply of materials or technical servicing. There are no problems with lunches and dinners because the dining room is open day and night. Participants in the inspection observed that the shop chiefs along with the masters coming on duty checked to make sure that the sections were provided with everything necessary, gave us exact placement of people and assignments for the brigades, and inspected the equipment. They did not forget into the next shop to make sure that it would not cause any delays. This policy has been in effect for a long time and it undoubtedly helps. This is the way it was on the day of the inspection as well.

Inspection brigade: people's controllers of Udmurtremstroybyt, M. Skudarnov and of the Krasnaya Zvezda Match Factory, A. Kazakovtseva; chairman of the people's control committee of the Irkutsk Heavy Machine Building Plant imeni V. V. Kuybyshev,

A. Fartusknyy; inspector of the Cheboksary people's control committee, N. Yegorov; our supernumerary correspondents, A. Trutnev, P. Len', and I. Filimonov; and our correspondents, V. Ovcharov, V. Denisov, Yu. Levitskiy and A. Petrov.

From the editorial staff. "It is clear to all of us, of course," said comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "that improving the well-being of the people is unthinkable without increasing the efficiency of the economy and intensifying all public production." An important path to achieving these goals is skillful utilization of the production potential of the enterprises and, particularly, 24-hour loading of equipment and technology. Special attention was devoted to questions of increasing the shift index. These questions should not be allowed to escape from the field of vision of managers and party organizations of enterprises and construction sites or peoples' control committees and posts.

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DEMOGRAPHY

STATISTICAL DATA ON UNION REPUBLICS AS OF JAN 1, 1980

Moscow VESTNIK STATISTIKI in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 58-67

[Statistics on Marriage, Family Size, and Statistical Data on Union Republics With Populations Exceeding 1 Million People, Births, Deaths, Real Growth, Marriages and Divorces in 1979]

[Text]

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

Marital Status, Women and Size of Families*

1. Distribution of the population 16 years and older according to marital status for the USSR and Union Republics (for 1,000 people of the corresponding sex)

	MEN				WOMEN			
	Married	Never Married	Widowed	Divorced, Separated	Married	Never Married	Widowed	Divorced, Separated
USSR	707	239	20	32	580	162	190	68
Urban population	701	241	18	38	577	176	167	79
Rural population	718	233	25	22	585	138	232	42
RSFSR	708	233	19	39	569	158	198	74
Urban population	704	235	17	43	569	172	174	84
Rural population	719	229	21	29	571	124	255	49
Ukrainian SSR	744	201	24	29	588	138	205	67
Urban population	733	211	20	34	599	154	167	78
Rural population	761	186	31	20	572	113	261	52
Belorussian SSR	719	237	21	22	589	171	189	50
Urban population	708	251	14	26	596	210	128	65
Rural population	732	220	30	16	580	126	260	32
Uzbek SSR	660	296	23	16	613	202	145	34
Urban population	625	326	21	24	567	215	156	58
Rural population	691	269	25	9	653	191	135	14
Kazakh SSR	676	277	18	27	598	181	162	36
Urban population	685	263	17	33	585	191	151	71
Rural population	663	296	20	18	616	167	180	33
Georgian SSR	692	265	24	12	589	191	177	37
Urban population	682	273	23	16	571	209	161	53
Rural population	704	256	26	7	610	171	193	19
Azerbaijan SSR	596	372	16	10	545	262	157	30
Urban population	573	391	17	14	540	252	158	45
Rural population	629	346	15	3	550	276	156	11
Lithuanian SSR	693	251	26	29	589	198	161	51
Urban population	694	250	19	36	582	216	136	67
Rural population	690	252	37	20	600	170	203	26
Moldavian SSR	740	216	25	17	629	163	155	51
Urban population	716	238	18	27	596	206	125	72
Rural population	736	202	30	10	652	133	176	37

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[*] Continuation of the publication of the principal results (for the beginning see No's 2, 6-11 for 1980).

	MEN				WOMEN			
	Married	Never Married	Widowed	Divorced, Separated	Married	Never Married	Widowed	Divorced, Separated
Latvian SSR	683	231	29	56	551	170	187	91
Urban population..........	687	227	25	60	551	174	169	105
Rural population..........	675	238	38	48	553	162	225	59
Kirghiz SSR	670	284	17	25	602	180	162	52
Urban population..........	649	303	16	30	569	202	152	75
Rural population..........	687	269	18	21	629	162	170	33
Tajik SSR	677	282	22	17	640	187	134	37
Urban population..........	644	308	18	29	594	181	150	74
Rural population..........	699	264	25	9	672	191	122	12
Armenian SSR	654	317	17	9	599	234	132	32
Urban population..........	654	315	17	11	592	239	127	39
Rural population..........	654	322	16	4	612	225	144	15
Turkmen SSR	653	296	31	17	610	210	142	35
Urban population..........	648	300	24	25	602	191	144	60
Rural population..........	659	291	39	7	620	230	139	7
Estonian SSR	676	242	27	53	550	178	188	83
Urban population..........	692	230	22	54	559	179	167	94
Rural population..........	640	267	39	53	529	175	237	58

According to the 1979 Census of the population 122.6 million men and women were married in the USSR which is 15.4 million people or 14.4 percent more in comparison with 1970. The relative proportion of those who are married is less for women than men and the number of widows and divorcees is greater. This is due to a fundamental excess in the number of women over men brought about chiefly by the repercussion of the Second World War.

2. Number of Families in the USSR and Union Republics and Their Grouping by Size

	Number of Families	Of the Total Number of Families Those That Are Composed of the Following Number of Members Living Together										Average Size of a Family (Members of the Family Living Together)
		2 People	3 People	4 People	5 People	6 People	7 People	8 People	9 People	10 or more People		
										Number of Families	Number of Members of the Family in Them	
USSR	50,307,[illegible]	19,[illegible]	15,[illegible]	15,1[illegible]9,485	6,[illegible]	2,761,1[illegible]3	1,323,931	[illegible]97,572	481,[illegible]	620,539	6,[illegible]	[illegible]
Urban population	2[illegible]	12,3[illegible]	11,649,[illegible]	10,[illegible]7,712	3,615,5[illegible]	1,255,137	469,[illegible]	243,021	12[illegible]	1[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Rural population	27,867,[illegible]	7,296,29[illegible]	[illegible]	4,675,774	2,695,938	1,[illegible]006	[illegible]	554,549	[illegible]	[illegible]65,939	5,160,710	[illegible]
RSFSR	36,724,589	11,408,393	11,389,242	8,587,825	3,148,875	1,092,683	597,380	169,029	72,924	58,458	631,[illegible]	[illegible]
Urban population	25,559,771	7,788,167	8,654,553	6,273,539	2,004,138	573,059	164,459	60,131	23,875	17,850	19[illegible],378	[illegible]
Rural population	11,164,818	3,820,226	2,934,689	2,314,286	1,144,717	519,424	232,921	108,898	49,049	40,608	[illegible]	[illegible]
Ukrainian SSR	13,431,865	4,436,171	3,939,194	3,174,662	1,231,076	439,349	134,363	46,784	17,668	12,598	135,8[illegible]9	[illegible]
Urban population	8,213,954	2,541,953	2,689,311	2,094,856	630,655	180,471	47,999	17,116	6,667	4,926	5[illegible],[illegible]26	3.2
Rural population	5,217,911	1,894,218	1,249,883	1,079,806	600,421	258,878	86,364	29,668	11,001	7,672	82,[illegible]68	3.3
Belorussian SSR	2,527,274	806,018	737,228	633,888	232,801	78,083	25,74[illegible]	8,506	3,062	1,945	20,843	[illegible]
Urban population	1,361,949	358,516	454,176	402,818	108,634	26,464	7,189	2,510	992	650	7,032	[illegible]
Rural population	1,165,325	447,502	283,052	231,070	124,167	51,619	18,554	5,996	2,070	1,295	13,[illegible]16	[illegible]
Uzbek SSR	2,647,493	355,570	379,281	432,117	333,101	295,490	246,758	213,964	153,992	237,220	2,66[illegible]	[illegible]
Urban population	1,224,342	221,658	240,140	263,596	157,062	114,372	76,033	59,099	36,281	56,101	635,00[illegible]	[illegible]
Rural population	1,423,151	133,912	139,141	168,521	176,039	181,118	170,725	154,865	117,711	181,119	2,026,022	6.2
Kazakh SSR	3,293,878	696,654	812,999	774,914	400,605	223,195	140,647	98,393	65,283	81,188	884,049	[illegible]
Urban population	1,923,686	456,597	556,160	509,178	210,117	89,662	43,946	25,792	14,619	17,615	192,701	[illegible]
Rural population	1,370,192	240,057	256,839	265,736	190,488	[illegible]533	96,701	72,601	50,664	63,573	691,348	[illegible]
Georgian SSR	1,150,836	263,199	228,745	287,510	192,263	112,413	48,[illegible]	21,270	8,81[illegible]	8,475	93,6[illegible]	4.0
Urban population	603,874	129,403	130,556	170,874	93,245	47,653	16,712	7,929	3,409	4,193	47,[illegible]59	3.9
Rural population	546,962	113,796	98,189	116,636	99,018	64,760	31,432	13,441	5,408	4,282	46,314	[illegible]
Azerbaijan SSR	1,102,712	165,270	161,194	191,110	168,083	141,387	101,745	73,949	45,581	54,393	597,[illegible]	[illegible]
Urban population	626,961	109,435	111,331	132,899	104,110	73,852	41,189	25,302	12,874	15,969	178,262	[illegible]
Rural population	475,751	55,835	49,863	58,211	63,973	67,535	60,356	48,647	32,707	38,424	419,[illegible]	[illegible]

	Number of Families	[illegible]										[illegible]
		2 People	[illegible] People	[illegible] People	[illegible] People	[illegible] People	[illegible] People	[illegible] People	[illegible] People	10 or more People		
										Number of Families	[illegible] of Persons [illegible] Families	
[illegible] SSR	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Urban population	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Rural population	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] SSR	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Urban population	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Rural population	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] SSR	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Urban population	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Rural population	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] SSR	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Urban population	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Rural population	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] SSR	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Urban population	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Rural population	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] SSR	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Urban population	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Rural population	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

1. Grouping of Families by the Number of Members of the Family Living Together for the USSR and the Union Republics in 1970 and 1979

	For 1,000 Families there are Families Comprised of:								10 and More People	Average Size of Family
	2 People	3 People	4 People	5 People	6 People	7 People	8 People	9 People		
USSR										
Urban and rural population										
1970	254	262	241	136	59	28	15	8	7	3.7
1979	297	289	230	95	41	20	12	7	9	[illegible]
Urban population										
1970	252	303	266	111	40	14	7	4	3	3.3
1979	291	322	249	85	29	11	6	3	4	3.3
Rural population										
1970	257	205	206	146	86	46	27	15	12	4.0
1979	306	230	196	113	62	36	23	15	19	3.8
RSFSR										
Urban and rural population										
1970	265	279	249	121	50	20	9	4	3	3.5
1979	316	315	234	86	30	11	5	2	1	3.3
Urban population										
1970	260	315	268	107	34	10	4	1	1	3.4
1979	305	339	246	78	22	6	2	1	1	3.2
Rural population										
1970	273	218	216	146	79	37	18	8	5	3.8
1979	342	263	207	103	46	21	10	4	4	3.6
Ukrainian SSR										
Urban and rural population										
1970	283	276	255	120	45	13	5	2	1	3.4
1979	330	293	236	92	33	10	4	1	1	3.3
Urban population										
1970	267	317	276	99	29	7	3	1	1	3.3
1979	309	327	255	77	22	6	2	1	1	3.2
Rural population										
1970	303	226	229	145	65	21	7	3	1	3.6
1979	363	239	207	115	50	17	6	2	1	3.?
Belorussian SSR										
Urban and rural population										
1970	264	242	259	145	60	20	7	2	1	3.6
1979	319	292	251	92	31	10	3	1	1	3.3
Urban population										
1970	220	294	316	122	35	8	3	1	1	[illegible]
1979	263	333	296	80	19	5	2	1	1	[illegible]
Rural population										
1970	296	203	216	162	79	29	10	3	2	[illegible]
1979	384	243	198	107	44	16	5	2	1	[illegible]

	For 1,000 Families there are Families Comprised of:								10 and More People	Average Size of Family
	2 People	3 People	4 People	5 People	6 People	7 People	8 People	9 People		
Uzbek SSR										
Urban and rural population										
1970	132	150	158	137	127	104	84	55	54	5.3
1979	[illegible]	142	163	126	112	93	81	58	90	5.5
Urban population										
1970	176	[illegible]	213	141	96	71	47	28	31	4.3
1979	181	196	215	125	84	62	48	30	46	4.6
Rural population										
1970	99	110	121	136	148	132	111	76	71	5.8
1979	96	98	118	124	127	120	109	83	127	6.2
Kazakh SSR										
Urban and rural population										
1970	178	215	227	152	96	56	37	22	19	4.3
1979	211	243	235	121	68	43	30	25	25	4.1
Urban population										
1970	201	256	261	144	69	32	18	10	9	3.9
1979	237	289	265	109	47	23	13	8	9	3.7
Rural population										
1970	152	167	188	161	123	83	59	36	35	4.8
1979	175	187	196	139	98	71	[illegible]	17	46	4.7
Georgian SSR										
Urban and rural population										
1970	204	198	241	179	102	43	19	8	6	4.1
1979	211	199	250	167	98	42	18	8	7	4.0
Urban population										
1970	212	227	272	165	78	25	11	5	5	3.8
1979	234	216	283	154	79	28	13	6	7	3.9
Rural population										
1970	197	170	211	191	126	60	27	12	7	4.3
1979	209	180	211	181	118	57	25	10	8	4.2
Azerbaijan SSR										
Urban and rural population										
1970	149	151	160	141	136	102	70	46	39	5.1
1979	150	146	171	151	128	92	67	42	49	5.1
Urban population										
1970	175	188	201	159	120	69	43	26	22	4.5
1979	175	170	212	160	118	66	40	20	25	4.3
Rural population										
1970	129	106	122	125	150	141	111	73	58	5.7
1979	117	105	122	133	142	127	107	69	82	5.8

	For 1,000 Families there are Families Comprised of:								10 and More People	Average Size of Family
	2 People	3 People	4 People	5 People	6 People	7 People	8 People	9 People		
Lithuanian SSR										
Urban and rural population										
1970	289	279	245	117	35	15	6	2	2	[illegible]
1979	318	292	234	91	29	20	4	1	1	[illegible]
Urban population										
1970	249	310	276	108	33	10	4	2	2	[illegible]
1979	283	322	283	82	21	5	2	1	1	[illegible]
Rural population										
1970	327	242	215	125	56	21	8	3	3	[illegible]
1979	370	248	211	105	41	15	6	2	2	[illegible]
Moldavian SSR										
Urban and rural population										
1970	266	245	221	125	68	36	21	11	7	[illegible]
1979	308	282	231	99	43	20	9	5	3	[illegible]
Urban population										
1970	262	312	257	102	39	15	7	3	3	[illegible]
1979	300	341	253	71	22	8	3	1	1	3.2
Rural population										
1970	268	213	204	136	81	46	27	15	10	[illegible]
1979	313	245	217	116	57	28	13	6	5	3.6
Latvian SSR										
Urban and rural population										
1970	336	315	225	85	27	7	3	1	1	[illegible]
1979	365	317	218	70	20	6	2	1	1	3.1
Urban population										
1970	309	346	236	79	22	5	1.7	0.8	0.5	3.2
1979	349	340	225	64	16	4	1	0.6	0.4	3.1
Rural population										
1970	381	265	207	96	35	10	4	1	1	[illegible]
1979	400	267	205	84	28	10	4	1	1	[illegible]
Kirghiz SSR										
Urban and rural population										
1970	173	191	198	142	102	74	57	35	28	[illegible]
1979	188	201	196	125	87	67	53	37	46	[illegible]
Urban population										
1970	214	242	245	138	71	38	26	15	13	[illegible]
1979	241	262	239	127	59	34	21	12	15	[illegible]
Rural population										
1970	144	154	165	145	123	100	86	50	39	[illegible]
1979	167	153	163	132	110	92	77	55	71	[illegible]

	Per 1,000 families ... families consisting of:									11 and more people	Average family size
	[illegible] people	[illegible]	[illegible] people	[illegible]	[illegible] people	[illegible] people	[illegible] people	[illegible]	[illegible]		
[illegible] SSR											
Urban and rural population:											
1970	128	[illegible]	150	192	109	112	49	58	61	[illegible]	
1979	111	[illegible]	151	[illegible]	104	94	63	66	111	[illegible]	
Urban population											
1970	182	[illegible]	218	131	92	54	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
1979	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	121	76	[illegible]	41	29	63	[illegible]	
Rural population											
1970	86	97	122	132	142	146	129	79	82	[illegible]	
1979	79	87	106	117	124	124	115	93	138	[illegible]	
[illegible] SSR											
Urban and rural population:											
1970	208	124	182	206	180	96	55	21	21	[illegible]	
1979	122	160	231	206	150	[illegible]	41	17	19	[illegible]	
Urban population											
1970	151	149	210	225	167	58	36	15	16	[illegible]	
1979	127	153	262	213	140	37	29	10	14	[illegible]	
Rural population											
1970	102	91	136	135	190	140	89	53	29	[illegible]	
1979	112	114	163	192	172	119	66	42	26	[illegible]	
Turkmen SSR											
Urban and rural population											
1970	146	162	158	123	114	97	82	57	61	[illegible]	
1979	138	153	162	120	103	88	77	61	98	5.3	
Urban population											
1970	188	209	199	125	90	66	53	36	38	[illegible]	
1979	184	206	208	122	85	62	48	36	53	[illegible]	
Rural population											
1970	103	109	131	121	141	132	114	81	85	[illegible]	
1979	85	91	115	117	126	119	111	92	151	[illegible]	
[illegible] SSR											
Urban and rural population											
1970	152	300	230	79	22	6	2	1	1	[illegible]	
1979	267	300	230	68	19	5	2	1	1	[illegible]	
Urban population											
1970	329	337	249	72	16	6	1.3	0.4	0.3	[illegible]	
1979	363	340	240	63	14.3	4	1	0.4	0.3	[illegible]	
Rural population											
1970	442	256	195	91	33	10	3	1	1	[illegible]	
1979	416	256	208	81	29	9	3	1	1	[illegible]	

Statistical Data by Capitals of the Union Republics and by Cities with a Population Greater than 1 Million People

1. Number and Density of Population on 1 Jan 1980

	Magnitude of Population in thousands of people	Number of Inhabitants per 1 km^2 in thousands of people
USSR..................	264,486	11.9 (people)
Including, by city:		
Alma-Ata...........	928	5.6
Ashkhabad..........	318	3.8
Baku...............	1,030	4.7
Vilnius............	492	1.9
Gor'kiy............	1,358	4.1
Dnepropetrovsk.....	1,083	2.7
Donetsk............	1,032	2.9
Dushanbe...........	501	4.0
Yerevan............	1,036	4.7
Kazan..............	1,002	3.6
Kiev...............	2,192	2.8
Kishinev...........	519	4.0
Kuybyshev..........	1,226	2.6
Leningrad*.........	4,119	6.6
Minsk..............	1,295	7.0
Moscow*............	7,915	9.0
Novosibirsk........	1,328	2.8
Odessa.............	1,057	7.7
Omsk...............	1,028	2.3
Perm'..............	1,008	1.4
Riga...............	843	2.8
Sverdlovsk.........	1,225	2.5
Tallinn............	436	2.5
Tashkent...........	1,816	7.1
Tbilisi............	1,080	3.1
Frunze.............	543	4.4
Khar'kov...........	1,464	4.8
Chelyabinsk........	1,042	2.1

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[*] The population of the cities of Moscow and Leningrad with their subordinate urban settlements comprises 8,099,000 and 4,638,000 people, respectively.

2. Birth Rate, Death Rate, Real Growth in the Population, Marriages and Divorces in 1979

	Number of Births	Number of Deaths	Real Growth in Population	Number of Marriages	Number of Divorces	Per 1,000 People of the Population				
						Births	Deaths	Real Growth	Marriages	Divorces
USSR	4,807,131	2,665,946	2,141,185	2,980,620	951,161	18.2	10.1	8.1	10.9	3.6
Including, by city:										
Alma-Ata	15,916	8,376	7,540	12,077	[illegible]	17.3	9.1	8.2	13.2	6.8
Ashkhabad	7,056	2,252	4,804	3,384	1,361	22.5	7.2	15.3	10.8	4.3
Baku	18,060	8,098	9,962	8,494	2,985	17.6	7.9	9.7	8.3	2.9
Vilnius	7,145	3,393	3,752	5,701	2,007	14.7	7.0	7.7	11.7	4.1
Gor'kiy	17,501	13,288	4,213	14,377	5,817	12.9	9.8	3.1	10.6	4.3
Dnepropetrovsk	15,122	9,969	5,153	13,039	5,704	14.1	9.3	4.8	12.1	5.3
Donetsk	13,742	8,850	4,892	12,150	5,627	13.4	8.6	4.8	11.8	5.5
Dushanbe	10,882	3,393	7,489	4,849	2,276	21.9	6.8	15.1	9.8	4.6
Yerevan	20,287	5,702	14,585	10,364	2,116	19.8	5.6	14.2	10.1	2.1
Kazan	14,303	8,984	5,319	9,748	4,603	14.3	9.0	5.3	9.8	4.6
Kiev	33,757	17,858	15,899	24,113	11,594	15.6	8.2	7.4	11.1	5.4
Kishinev	9,582	3,291	6,291	6,411	2,757	18.8	6.4	12.4	12.6	5.4
Kuybyshev	16,930	12,274	4,656	13,111	6,942	13.9	10.1	3.8	10.7	5.7
Leningrad*	61,936	52,413	9,523	57,554	28,071	13.4	11.4	2.0	12.5	6.1
Minsk	23,753	6,863	16,890	15,298	5,705	18.6	5.4	13.2	12.0	4.5
Moscow*	106,219	95,211	11,008	90,430	44,455	13.2	11.8	1.4	11.2	5.5
Novosibirsk	20,365	12,227	8,138	16,844	8,477	15.4	9.3	6.1	12.8	6.4
Odessa	12,772	10,350	2,422	12,030	6,846	12.1	9.8	2.3	11.4	6.5
Omsk	17,834	8,448	9,386	12,032	5,799	17.5	8.3	9.2	11.8	5.7
Perm'	14,845	9,275	5,570	9,736	4,092	14.8	9.2	5.6	9.7	4.1
Riga	10,479	9,359	1,120	9,675	5,404	12.5	11.1	1.4	11.5	6.4
Sverdlovsk	17,483	10,982	6,501	13,185	5,888	14.3	9.0	5.3	10.8	4.8
Tallinn	6,348	4,363	1,985	4,771	2,264	14.7	10.1	4.6	11.0	5.2
Tashkent	34,537	14,244	20,293	18,434	6,978	19.2	7.9	11.3	10.3	3.9
Tbilisi	17,257	8,673	8,584	10,969	3,159	16.1	8.1	8.0	10.2	2.9
Frunze	10,704	4,133	6,571	6,268	2,493	19.9	7.7	12.2	11.7	4.6
Khar'kov	19,973	14,761	5,212	17,210	8,131	13.8	10.2	3.6	11.8	5.6
Chelyabinsk	16,694	8,992	7,702	11,121	5,338	16.1	8.7	7.4	10.7	5.2

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* Including the urban population that is subordinate to the gorsovet

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DEMOGRAPHY

DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL ASPECTS OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Moscow SOVETSKAYA POTREBITEL'SKAYA KOOPERATSIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 80
pp 16-19

[Article by V. Perevedentsev, candidate of economic sciences: "Demographic and Social Aspects of Rural Development"]

[Text] The Soviet countryside is developing rapidly. The technology and organization of production and the machinery used are changing. Large-scale housing construction is underway. Living conditions are improving and culture is growing. It is widely known that the general direction of rural development is toward convergence with the city, toward elimination of the socioeconomic and cultural-domestic differences between the city and the country.

A great deal has been done in the 15 years that have passed since the March 1965 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which was devoted to urgent steps toward further development of USSR agriculture. The countryside has been renovated and the living conditions of the peasants have been improved. But even more must be done to achieve a fundamental transformation of the countryside.

Today, when the challenge has been posed of coordinating the solutions of current and long-range problems more carefully in the interest of carrying out party economic policy, it is very important to look at the countryside of tomorrow. What will it be like, for example, in 20 years, in the year 2000? This is an extremely important question. A great deal depends on how well we can answer it, above all the efficiency of rural development.

Many different factors influence rural development, so any prediction can only be probabilistic. Nonetheless, despite the difficulties of forecasting, we will try to look into the future.

Rural Population

How many rural inhabitants will the country have in the year 2000? What will the structure of the rural population be?

There is no doubt that the number of rural inhabitants for the country as a whole will be significantly lower than it is today. Why is this?

Let us look at the development of rural populations in the last three decades.

At the start of 1950 there were 109.1 million people living in rural areas; by the beginning of 1965 the figure was 108.9 million. As we see, in 15 years the number of rural inhabitants was practically unchanged. This means that the net outflow of rural population to the cities equaled its natural growth. But now at the beginning of 1980 there were 98.4 million rural inhabitants. In other words, in the last 15 years the rural population has declined by more than 10 million. The net outflow from the countryside has, as we see, become greater than natural growth of rural population. Judging by all factors, rural population will decline more rapidly in the near future than it has at earlier times. Let us look at both aspects of the demographic balance: natural growth and out-migration.

The birth rate will drop in coming years. The reason for this is the relatively small number of people born in the 1960's and 1970's. Needless to say, vigorous demographic policy can bring about some increase in the birth rate, but it is very unlikely that such an increase would be sufficient to compensate for the decline in the number of parents. Moreover, the size of the rural population is declining because of young people going to the city.

Out-migration from the countryside today results mainly from the need of the cities for additional labor. How will this demand change? If other conditions are equal it will unquestionably increase because the growth in able-bodied population will drop sharply.

But is it possible for the movement of rural population to the cities to increase from the standpoint of providing labor for agriculture? Is there really a surplus of labor in the countryside?

Some people believe that there is a shortage of labor in the countryside today, that agriculture is experiencing a shortage of labor. This is undoubtedly true in many regions of the country, in particular most of the oblasts of the Nonchernozem zone of the RSFSR. There are many other regions in the country, however, where rural areas have surplus labor. Foremost among them are Central Asia, the Transcaucasus, and the Northern Caucasus. A significant labor surplus also exists in Moldavia, the Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia, and even at certain places in the Nonchernozem zone, for example the Chuvash ASSR. Judging by available scientific research and statistical studies, the surplus of labor resources in the rural areas of some regions of the country is substantially larger than the shortage in others.

The basic problem is not that too many people are leaving the countryside but that rural population is moving from places where there is a shortage of labor in agriculture and hardly at all leaving the places which have large surpluses of labor resources.

The net out-migration from rural areas of the Russian Federation per 1,000 rural inhabitants is roughly six times as great as the figure for Central Asia. In the nine years between the two most recent censuses, therefore, the number of rural inhabitants in Orlovskaya Oblast decreased by 30 percent, in

Kostromskaya Oblast by 28 percent, and in various other oblasts of Russia by 25-27 percent. At the same time, rural population in Tajikistan increased by 36 percent. Yet Kostromskaya Oblast had a serious shortage of workers in agriculture in 1970, whereas Tajikistan had a large surplus.

We have a critical problem of reducing the outflow of rural population in some places and at the same time intensifying this outflow in others. But this is a different question. As a whole the rural regions of the country have a surplus of labor. Furthermore, there is no doubt that labor productivity in agriculture will rise, so the need for workers in agriculture will decline. This process is a continuous one.

It is highly likely that the rural population by the end of the century will be 75-80 million, which is about 20 million less than the current population. The more successfully the country's agriculture develops, the more rapidly total rural population will decrease.

What qualitative changes will there be in the rural population?

The proportion of elderly and old people in the population will increase, on the one hand, while the proportion of children and adolescents will decrease, on the other.

But the sex structure of the population will improve significantly. At the present time there are many fewer men than women among those who participated in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45. By the end of the century the ratio between sexes will improve markedly. This means that there will be a sharp decrease in the number of old single women. Everyone who is familiar with the Central Russian countryside, for example, knows that they constitute a large share of the rural population today.

The educational level of the rural population will rise significantly. Practically all adults under the age of 40 will have at least secondary education. The proportion of the intelligentsia in general and persons with higher education in particular will rise.

It can be expected that future inhabitants of the countryside will have greater wants and needs than the present population. Moreover, their income will increase. This makes it essential to sharply increase the level of services to this population in every respect: education, culture , trade, and so on.

The cooperatives have a great deal to do in this respect. Modern department stores and specialized stores must be built in the country and shopping complexes established. The network of public catering enterprises must be expanded. Evening restaurants and cafes, delicatessens, and every possible kind of service should be necessary parts of the rural way of life. In addition, there should be further development of delivery of goods by vehicles of specialized and general-purpose stores.

Every peasant will want to enjoy city conveniences in addition to the benefits to the rural way of life, and this is their inalienable right.

Rural Settlements and Pattern of Settlement

According to the 1970 census, there were more than 469,000 rural populated points in the country with an average population of slightly more than 200 persons. A large majority of the communities had less than 100 persons. Only two-fifths of the rural population lived in relatively large settlements, that is, with more than 1,000 population.

But this average picture is derived from a great diversity of local patterns of settlement. In some places the large majority of rural inhabitants live in villages with just one or two households, while in others they live in large towns. The general rule is "the further south the town is, the larger it will be."

The pattern of rural settlement generally follows natural zones. A dense network of small settlements is typical of the forest zone. The steppe zone has a sparse network of large towns. In Pskovskaya Oblast, a forested region, for example, small settlements with no more than 7-8 households apiece predominate There are almost no large towns. Krasnodarskiy Kray has almost no small settlements; three-quarters of the rural inhabitants live in large settlements.

This pattern developed historically under the decisive influence of economic needs. In the forest zone agricultural land is spread out in small plots among forested areas. Consolidation of villages meant being further from the fields and pasture lands. The situation was complicated by lack of roads.

In the steppe zone agricultural land occurs in large continuous blocks and transportation conditions are much better than in the forest zone. At the same time there is a shortage of water. Therefore, settlements are located in river valleys and along streams and ravines.

The historically established pattern of small settlements has now become very inconvenient. It greatly complicates agricultural production and services. It is difficult to build and maintain schools, clubs, and stores in tiny villages.

Some 10 years ago the prevailing opinion was that there must be a fundamental reorganization of the rural settlement patterns as quickly as possible, moving the inhabitants of small and medium-sized settlements to large urban-type communities or "agrocities."

A large number of rural populated points were declared to be useless for the future. New production and residential-domestic construction in them was banned. At the same time, one or several experimental-demonstration communities were built in every oblast. They were chiefly composed of urban-type high-rise buildings with full utility services, which means all "urban conveniences," but without private farming plots, outbuildings for livestock and vehicles, cellars, and the like.

The advocates of this type of rural reorganization counted on the fact that urban-type communities with a large number of inhabitants (3,000-[illegible],000 and more apiece) make it possible to organize living conditions well and inexpensively and create good cultural-domestic and other conditions. They would have secondary schools, clubs, large stores, all kinds of service shops, and so on right there. In this, of course, the advocates were correct. However, they overlooked the impact of such concentration of rural population on agriculture itself and also ignored the question of the investment necessary for such a reorganization.

The real world demonstrated the error of this path. Today the well-built individual home with a private plot and outbuildings for livestock and vehicles is considered the basic type of rural dwelling. As engineer M. Kolotov correctly remarked in PRAVDA, "The construction of individual homes and creation of conditions for conducting private farming operations is the best way to keep workers in the countryside."

The contemplated concentration of rural population in large settlements did not come about. Kalininskaya Oblast, a typical oblast in the Nonchernozem zone, had 741,000 rural inhabitants in 1970. This was an average of 61 persons per settlement. In the nine years between the 1970 census and the 1979 census the rural population declined to 549,000. The average settlement in the oblast today has less than 60 persons. Before the results of the most recent census are published it is hard to say how typical this process of continued diminution of rural populated points is for the country as a whole. We will observe, however, that researchers have also noted this trend in other regions of the country, in particular in Siberia.

Suppose for a minute that the population of Kalininskaya Oblast was gathered into urban-type communities with 3,000 inhabitants each. Then, because of the population density (6.5 persons per square kilometer) many agricultural lands would be 20 kilometers and more away from the settlement. It is certainly unnecessary to prove that given current bad road conditions in the spring and fall muddy seasons this would have a very bad effect on economic activity. It has been observed in the literature many times that the disappearance of a little village usually leads to abandonment of the fields adjacent to it and to the invasion of pasture lands by brush. In short, it leads to neglect of the land.

No matter how we look at it, a general resettlement of the rural population, the "elimination" of villages, and universal construction of urban communities and "agrocities" does not appear possible in this century.

It is absolutely certain that tens of millions of rural inhabitants will continue to live in small and medium-sized rural settlements in the year 2000. And this is the pattern of settlement to which all forms of service for r. inhabitants, including schools, medical service, and trade, should be tailored.

Transformation of the Countryside

Many studies of rural migration show that the principal cause of the desire of rural inhabitants to move to the city is dissatisfaction with working and living conditions and cultural life in the country.

It is hard to say which is more important. Everything is interrelated. If, for example, working conditions at a stock farm improved, living conditions will be felt more acutely; if free time increases, cultural demands rise immediately.

The general direction of changes taking place in the countryside is toward a convergence with the city, urbanization of the countryside. We should note that the rural inhabitants of heavily urbanized areas themselves consciously aspire to transfer all the features of urban life to rural life. "I want everything for us in the countryside to be like it is in the city." I have heard this and similar remarks many times in little Russian towns, especially from young people. And it shows in everything, with the possible exception of the housing question. On this most people hold a "village" point of view and prefer the rural-type individual home.

But is it possible, and necessary, to make the countryside resemble the city in every respect?

Of course it is not. There are rural advantages which should be preserved. For example, in the countryside "everybody knows everybody else" and "everybody knows about everything." This is inevitable if the town has a few dozen or a few hundred inhabitants. Is this good or bad? There is no one definite answer. For an urban dweller who is accustomed to urban "anonymity" it is unusual and unpleasant. But this very anonymity is equally unusual and unpleasant to a rural person.

Take another feature of the countryside, such as closeness to the earth, to nature. It is a tremendous advantage. It is true that rural inhabitants are sometimes not conscious of it, but city-dwellers feel it acutely. It is no accident that they have such a desire to go to a dacha during the summer. We should observe that a good rural home serves the functions of a dacha excellently, for the rural inhabitants themselves and for their urban friends and relatives.

The rhythm of rural life also differs from urban life. The rural inhabitant is not rushed, tense, and "wound up" the way inhabitants of a large modern city typically are.

For the sum total of living conditions, however, the country is still significantly inferior to the city. In particular, the everyday conveniences of rural life lag far behind.

Improving these conditions is the key challenge in improving rural life and bringing the countryside closer to the city.

The principal issue here is the home, its conveniences. For example, think how much time city-dwellers save by having running water and hot water in the kitchen! And central heating! And then the gas, or even better, electric range! Most rural women have only heard about these things or glanced them when visiting friends and relatives in the city.

Large apartment buildings and utilities hookups are not at all necessary to have everyday conveniences in the countryside. Just one thing is necessary, electricity. The answer is the fully electrified house. An electric range in the kitchen, an electric water heater in the bathroom, a small electric motor pumping water from an individual well, electric heat and, if necessary, electrical cooling. And then millions of fine rural homes, many of which are bad only because they do not have "urban" conveniences, will be usable for many long decades and bring satisfaction to their owners. All that is needed is modernization, fixing up the "inside" of the home. And of course, this is much cheaper than building new homes.

Needless to say, mass production of the necessary equipment must be organized. We should observe that millions of electric ranges have already been installed in the cities, but there are practically none in the countryside. It is sometimes said that there is no electricity. This is an excuse or an incompetent opinion. Large amounts of electricity are needed only for heating, and for this it is possible to use the surplus energy in the "low" part of the daily consumption schedule. Expensive pumped-storage electric power plants are now being built to use this energy. During the night the water is pumped up, and then during the peak hours its falling produces additional energy. As for electric ranges, they consume less energy than primitive hot plates which are widely used everywhere.

Natural gas can, of course, also be used in many cases in place of electricity if gas lines run nearby. A gas canister in the bathroom and other appliances working on gas have long been familiar.

We spoke about the "inside" of old homes. But this does not at all mean that there are no other ways to transform the village. Extensive rural construction is underway throughout the country. Housing resources at farms are being updated everywhere, especially in the Nonchernozem zone. Brick homes with all conveniences are being built in many rural towns with gardens and orchards beginning right at the door. Roads and walks are being laid. Trees are being planted and domestic and trade enterprises, medical services, and schools are improving their operations. In short, the towns and villages are being updated quickly; the living conditions of rural workers are being reorganized in a contemporary fashion. And this is a joint challenge and duty for all organizations, party, Soviet, economic, and cooperative.

The countryside can only be modernized through combined efforts. Nonetheless, it is by no means necessary to follow the same path that is taken in building a city. We can (and must!) "cut corners," taking advantage of scientific and technical advances which are particularly suitable in the countryside, where there is a dispersed pattern of settlement.

Twenty years is long enough for the countryside to not only catch up with but pass the city in certain respects so that rural living conditions on the whole are just as good as those in the city.

> From the Editors. V. Perevedntsev's article on demographic and social aspects of rural development contains interesting ideas and statements, although they are by no means undisputed. The author himself acknowledges that it is extremely difficult to determine the prospects for rural development and

different points of view may exist on this issue. But we believe, nonetheless, that this article will unquestionably be interesting to members of cooperatives, especially those who are working out future plans for the development of the economic and social activities of the consumer cooperative system.

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DEMOGRAPHY

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION ACCORDING TO SOURCES OF INCOME, DATA ON NATION'S WOMEN

Moscow VESTNIK STATISTIKI in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 63-79

[Tables 1-4 group people according to sources of income and according to occupation by union republic. Tables 1-25 provide information on women in USSR including percentages of women in certain occupations as well as services provided for women. Authors of the articles are:

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[Text]

ALL UNION CENSUS OF THE POPULATION
SOURCES OF INCOME AND SOCIAL GROUPS

1. Distribution of the population of the USSR and Union Republics by sources of income[1]

	The Entire Population	Including				
		Population Employed (Excluding Those Engaged in Personal Subsidiary Work)	Grant-Aided Students	Pensioners and Other People Who are Provided for by the State[2]	Dependents of Individual People and Also Those Who are Engaged in Personal Subsidiary Work	People Who Have Another Source of Income and Who did not Indicate the Source
USSR	262,084,654	134,959,651	6,632,991	40,025,978	80,194,773	271,261
Urban population	162,442,608	89,382,119	5,838,806	21,852,121	45,188,127	181,435
Rural population	99,642,046	45,577,532	794,185	18,173,857	35,006,646	89,826
RSFSR	137,409,921	74,246,723	3,474,101	22,563,864	36,975,968	149,265
Urban population	94,942,296	53,896,801	3,144,279	13,711,440	24,089,416	100,360
Rural population	42,467,625	20,349,922	329,822	8,852,424	12,886,552	48,905
Ukrainian SSR	49,609,333	25,838,840	1,233,657	9,089,608	13,390,884	56,344
Urban population	30,168,937	16,532,232	1,099,065	4,402,305	8,096,237	39,098
Rural population	19,440,396	9,306,608	134,592	4,687,303	5,294,647	17,246
Belorussian SSR	9,532,516	4,981,753	251,030	1,589,898	2,702,228	7,607
Urban population	5,234,295	2,996,092	222,095	528,575	1,482,968	4,565
Rural population	4,298,221	1,985,661	28,935	1,061,323	1,219,260	3,042
Uzbek SSR	15,389,307	6,201,077	401,013	1,342,728	7,433,668	10,821
Urban population	6,281,636	2,768,119	328,986	574,841	2,603,126	6,564
Rural population	9,107,671	3,432,958	72,027	767,887	4,830,542	4,257
Kazakh SSR	14,684,283	6,892,349	390,189	1,518,533	5,869,670	13,542
Urban population	7,855,220	4,040,106	310,316	813,341	2,682,505	8,952
Rural population	6,829,063	2,852,243	79,873	705,192	3,187,165	4,590
Georgian SSR	4,993,182	2,519,204	114,937	663,616	1,688,945	6,480
Urban population	2,548,667	1,321,958	90,573	289,172	842,331	4,633
Rural population	2,444,515	1,197,246	24,364	374,444	846,614	1,847
Azerbaijan SSR	6,026,515	2,634,876	180,199	505,821	2,700,281	5,338
Urban population	3,169,962	1,465,390	166,978	271,949	1,262,060	3,585
Rural population	2,856,553	1,169,486	13,221	233,872	1,438,221	1,753

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[1] Continuation of the publication of the results of the census in VESTNIK STATISTIKI magazine (for the beginning see № 2, 6-12 for 1980)

[2] The total number of pensioners at the beginning of 1979 comprised 47.6 million people. Only those people for whom a pension is the main source of income placed themselves under the group of pensioners for the census. Pensioners who regularly work were considered with the number of employed population.

	The Entire Population	Including				
		Population Employed (Excluding Those Engaged in Personal Subsidiary Farms)	Students Receiving Stipends	Pensioners and Other People Who are Provided for by the State	Dependents of Individual People and Also Those Who are Engaged in Personal Subsidiary Farms	People Who Have Another Source of Income and the [illegible] the Source
Lithuanian SSR	3,391,490	1,749,467	93,225	520,982	1,025,507	4,322
Urban population..........	2,034,879	1,142,241	73,833	216,133	601,851	2,834
Rural population..........	1,356,611	607,226	19,392	304,849	423,656	1,488
Moldavian SSR	3,949,756	2,059,856	80,295	462,664	1,264,133	3,411
Urban population..........	1,542,924	862,041	65,318	142,256	418,252	2,049
Rural population..........	2,406,832	1,197,815	14,977	320,408	845,881	1,362
Latvian SSR	2,502,816	1,371,608	56,406	430,265	641,360	3,177
Urban population..........	1,697,026	990,931	46,101	239,456	418,603	1,935
Rural population..........	805,790	380,677	10,305	190,809	222,757	1,242
Kirghiz SSR	3,522,832	1,493,181	82,665	358,073	1,585,778	3,135
Urban population..........	1,348,761	656,183	62,304	141,920	486,756	1,598
Rural population..........	2,174,071	836,998	20,361	216,153	1,099,022	1,537
Tajik SSR	3,806,220	1,493,174	69,993	287,768	1,953,649	1,636
Urban population..........	1,315,827	575,456	57,163	103,631	578,477	1,100
Rural population..........	2,490,393	917,718	12,830	184,137	1,375,172	536
Armenian SSR	3,037,259	1,440,807	128,949	262,219	1,202,795	2,489
Urban population..........	1,985,679	966,169	108,405	155,316	753,889	1,900
Rural population..........	1,051,580	474,638	20,544	106,903	448,906	589
Turkmen SSR	2,764,748	1,138,378	46,804	206,864	1,371,393	1,309
Urban population..........	1,309,673	577,325	39,428	97,371	594,514	1,035
Rural population..........	1,455,075	561,053	7,376	109,493	776,879	274
Estonian SSR	1,464,476	798,360	29,529	245,077	389,514	1,996
Urban population..........	1,016,826	591,077	23,961	136,417	264,142	1,234
Rural population..........	447,650	207,283	5,568	108,660	125,372	762

2. Distribution of the population of the USSR and Union Republics by the sources of income in 1970 and 1979 (by percentage)

	1970					1979				
	Population Employed (Excluding Those Engaged in Personal Subsidiary Work)[1]	Grant-Aided Students	Pensioners and Other People Who are Provided for by the State	Dependents of Individual People and Also Those Who are Engaged in Personal Subsidiary Work	People Who Have Another Source of Income and Who did not Indicate the Source	Population Employed (Excluding Those Engaged in Personal Subsidiary Work)[1]	Grant-Aided Students	Pensioners and Other People Who are Provided for by the State	Dependents of Individual People and Also Those Who are Engaged in Personal Subsidiary Work	People Who Have Another Source of Income and Who did not Indicate the Source
USSR	51.7	1.5	14.5	32.2	0.1	51.5	2.5	15.3	30.6	0.1
Urban population........	52.6	2.5	11.8	33.0	0.1	55.0	3.6	13.4	27.9	0.1
Rural population........	41.8	0.3	15.8	42.0	0.1	45.6	0.8	18.4	35.1	0.1
RSFSR	49.9	1.5	14.3	34.2	0.1	54.0	2.5	16.4	27.0	0.1
Urban population........	54.2	2.2	12.6	30.9	0.1	56.8	3.3	14.4	25.4	0.1
Rural population........	42.8	0.4	17.1	39.6	0.1	47.9	0.8	20.8	30.4	0.1
Ukrainian SSR	49.5	1.4	15.7	33.3	0.1	52.1	2.5	18.3	27.0	0.1
Urban population........	52.4	2.3	12.5	32.6	0.2	54.8	3.7	14.6	26.8	0.1
Rural population........	45.9	0.3	19.6	34.1	0.1	47.9	0.7	24.1	27.2	0.1
Belorussian SSR	47.8	1.5	14.7	35.9	0.1	52.2	2.6	16.7	28.4	0.1
Urban population........	54.0	3.0	9.4	33.5	0.1	57.2	4.2	10.1	28.4	0.1
Rural population........	43.1	0.3	18.8	37.7	0.1	46.2	0.7	24.7	28.3	0.1
Uzbek SSR	36.0	1.4	8.6	53.8	0.2	40.3	2.6	8.7	48.3	0.1
Urban population........	40.9	3.2	7.1	48.7	0.1	44.1	5.3	9.1	41.4	0.1
Rural population........	33.7	0.3	8.0	57.8	0.2	37.7	0.8	8.4	53.0	0.1
Kazakh SSR	42.2	1.4	9.5	46.8	0.1	46.9	2.7	10.3	40.0	0.1
Urban population........	48.1	2.4	8.6	40.8	0.1	51.4	3.9	10.4	34.2	0.1
Rural population........	36.4	0.4	9.2	53.9	0.1	41.8	1.2	10.3	46.6	0.1
Georgian SSR	44.1	1.8	11.6	42.3	0.2	50.4	2.3	13.3	33.9	0.1
Urban population........	46.8	1.7	10.0	41.2	0.3	51.9	3.6	11.3	33.0	0.2
Rural population........	43.3	0.3	13.1	43.2	0.1	49.0	1.0	15.3	34.6	0.1
Azerbaijan SSR	34.7	1.2	8.6	55.4	0.1	43.7	3.0	8.4	44.8	0.1
Urban population........	39.0	2.3	8.7	49.8	0.2	46.2	5.3	8.6	39.8	0.1
Rural population........	30.4	0.2	8.4	60.9	0.1	40.7	0.5	8.3	50.4	0.1

	1970					1979				
	Population Employed (Excluding Those Engaged in Personal Subsidiary Work)	Grant-Aided Students	Pensioners and Other People Who are Provided for by the State	Dependents of Individual People and Also Those Who are Engaged in Personal Subsidiary Work	People Who Have Another Source of Income and Who did not Indicate the Source	Population Employed (Excluding Those Engaged in Personal Subsidiary Work)	Grant-Aided Students	Pensioners and Other People Who are Provided for by the State	Dependents of Individual People and Also Those Who are Engaged in Personal Subsidiary Work	People Who Have Another Source of Income and Who did not Indicate the Source
Lithuanian SSR	49.1	1.9	12.3	36.4	0.3	51.6	2.8	15.3	30.2	0.1
Urban population......	54.6	3.1	8.0	34.0	0.3	56.1	3.6	10.5	29.6	0.2
Rural population......	43.6	0.7	16.5	38.9	0.3	44.8	1.4	22.5	31.2	0.1
Moldavian SSR	50.1	1.6	9.7	38.5	0.1	52.1	2.0	13.8	32.0	0.1
Urban population......	53.2	4.3	8.9	33.4	0.2	56.2	4.3	11.3	28.1	0.1
Rural population......	48.7	0.4	10.0	40.8	0.1	49.6	0.6	15.3	34.4	0.1
Latvian SSR	53.5	1.5	15.4	29.4	0.2	54.8	2.3	17.2	25.6	0.1
Urban population......	58.1	2.0	12.2	27.5	0.2	58.4	2.7	14.2	24.6	0.1
Rural population......	45.9	0.7	20.7	32.5	0.2	47.2	1.3	23.7	27.6	0.2
Kirghiz SSR	38.3	1.3	9.6	50.7	0.1	42.4	2.3	10.2	45.0	0.1
Urban population......	44.7	3.2	8.9	43.0	0.2	48.7	4.6	10.5	36.1	0.1
Rural population......	34.5	0.2	10.0	55.2	0.1	38.5	0.9	9.9	50.6	0.1
Tajik SSR	34.7	1.3	7.7	56.1	0.2	39.2	1.8	7.5	51.4	0.1
Urban population......	40.2	3.1	6.7	49.8	0.2	43.7	4.3	7.9	44.0	0.1
Rural population......	31.4	0.2	8.2	59.9	0.3	36.9	0.5	7.4	55.2	0.0
Armenian SSR	39.3	1.5	8.3	50.6	0.3	47.4	4.2	8.7	39.6	0.1
Urban population......	42.0	2.3	7.7	47.7	0.3	48.6	5.5	7.8	38.0	0.1
Rural population......	35.5	0.4	9.1	54.7	0.3	45.1	1.9	10.2	42.7	0.1
Turkmen SSR	37.2	1.3	7.4	54.0	0.1	41.2	1.7	7.5	49.6	0.0
Urban population......	40.8	2.4	6.6	50.1	0.1	44.1	3.0	7.4	45.4	0.1
Rural population......	33.9	0.2	8.2	57.6	0.1	38.6	0.5	7.5	53.4	0.0
Estonian SSR	53.3	1.4	15.8	29.3	0.2	54.5	2.0	16.8	26.6	0.1
Urban population......	57.6	1.7	12.1	28.4	0.2	58.1	2.4	13.4	26.0	0.1
Rural population......	45.5	0.7	22.4	31.1	0.3	46.3	1.2	24.3	28.0	0.2

3. Distribution of the population of the USSR and Union Republics by social groups

	The Entire Population (Including Unemployed Members of Families)	Including			As a percentage of the entire population		
		Laborers	Office Personnel	Kolkhoz Workers	Laborers	Office Personnel	Kolkhoz Workers
USSR	262,084,654	157,122,843	65,666,500	39,144,472	60.0	25.1	14.9
Urban population...........	162,442,608	106,065,766	52,907,619	3,384,295	65.3	32.6	2.1
Rural population...........	99,642,046	51,057,077	12,758,881	35,760,177	51.3	12.8	35.9
RSFSR	137,409,921	86,532,063	37,010,087	13,802,301	63.0	26.9	10.0
Urban population...........	94,942,296	62,348,822	31,153,850	1,402,575	65.7	32.8	1.5
Rural population...........	42,467,625	24,183,241	5,856,237	12,399,726	56.9	13.8	29.2
Ukrainian SSR	49,609,333	27,188,575	10,997,487	11,391,935	54.8	22.2	23.0
Urban population...........	30,168,937	19,729,832	9,382,078	1,039,175	65.4	31.1	3.4
Rural population...........	19,440,396	7,458,743	1,615,409	10,352,760	38.4	8.3	53.2
Belorussian SSR	9,532,516	5,317,424	2,178,538	2,031,237	55.8	22.8	21.3
Urban population...........	5,234,295	3,338,380	1,759,891	133,545	63.8	33.6	2.6
Rural population...........	4,298,221	1,979,044	418,647	1,897,692	46.0	9.7	44.2
Uzbek SSR	15,389,307	8,141,583	3,439,929	3,798,751	52.9	22.3	24.7
Urban population...........	6,281,636	4,000,688	1,988,167	286,641	63.7	31.6	4.6
Rural population...........	9,107,671	4,140,895	1,451,762	3,512,110	45.5	15.9	38.6
Kazakh SSR	14,684,283	9,988,682	3,739,813	949,593	68.0	25.5	6.5
Urban population...........	7,855,220	5,244,262	2,531,303	76,551	66.8	32.2	1.0
Rural population...........	6,829,063	4,744,420	1,208,510	873,042	69.5	17.7	12.8
Georgian SSR	4,993,182	2,775,282	1,324,311	889,558	55.6	26.5	17.8
Urban population...........	2,548,667	1,497,977	1,010,420	38,376	58.8	39.6	1.5
Rural population...........	2,444,515	1,277,305	313,891	851,182	52.3	12.8	34.8
Azerbaijan SSR	6,026,515	3,590,941	1,419,922	1,010,051	59.6	23.6	16.7
Urban population...........	3,169,962	2,068,283	1,020,627	78,283	65.2	32.2	2.5
Rural population...........	2,856,553	1,522,658	399,295	931,768	53.3	14.0	32.6
Lithuanian SSR	3,391,490	1,926,587	784,390	676,136	56.8	23.1	20.0
Urban population...........	2,034,879	1,329,200	659,847	43,467	65.3	32.4	2.2
Rural population...........	1,356,611	597,387	124,543	632,669	44.0	9.2	46.6
Moldavian SSR	3,949,756	2,075,442	692,186	1,176,837	52.6	17.5	29.8
Urban population...........	1,532,924	933,241	505,536	92,353	60.9	33.0	6.0
Rural population...........	2,416,832	1,142,201	186,650	1,084,484	47.3	7.7	44.9
Latvian SSR	2,502,816	1,467,829	696,239	336,822	58.6	27.8	13.5
Urban population...........	1,697,026	1,063,770	594,660	37,468	62.7	35.0	2.2
Rural population...........	805,790	404,059	101,579	299,354	50.1	12.6	37.2
Kirghiz SSR	3,522,832	2,035,804	770,676	714,589	57.8	21.9	20.3
Urban population...........	1,348,761	870,283	434,479	43,324	64.5	32.2	3.2
Rural population...........	2,174,071	1,165,521	336,197	671,265	53.6	15.5	30.9
Tajik SSR	3,806,220	2,017,967	784,758	1,001,033	53.0	20.6	26.3
Urban population...........	1,315,827	842,927	430,378	40,758	64.1	32.7	3.1
Rural population...........	2,490,393	1,175,040	354,380	960,275	47.2	14.2	38.6
Armenian SSR	3,037,259	1,949,063	792,783	293,916	64.2	26.1	9.7
Urban population...........	1,985,679	1,303,549	660,223	21,017	65.6	33.3	1.1
Rural population...........	1,051,580	645,514	132,560	272,899	61.4	12.6	25.9
Turkmen SSR	2,764,748	1,223,222	613,882	923,026	44.2	22.2	33.4
Urban population...........	1,309,671	848,342	423,240	33,840	64.8	32.3	2.6
Rural population...........	1,455,075	374,880	190,642	889,186	25.8	13.1	61.[illegible]
Estonian SSR	1,464,476	892,379	421,499	148,687	60.9	28.8	10.1
Urban population...........	1,016,826	646,210	352,920	16,922	63.5	34.7	1.7
Rural population...........	447,650	246,169	68,579	131,765	55.0	15.3	29.4

4. Distribution of the employed population of the USSR and Union Republics by social groups

	The Entire Employed Population	Including			As a percentage of the entire employed population		
		Laborers	Office Personnel	Kolkhoz Workers	Laborers	Office Personnel	Kolkhoz Workers
USSR	134,859,651	80,940,675	38,899,045	14,967,917	60.0	28.9	11.1
Urban population..........	89,182,119	56,940,361	31,765,314	651,621	63.7	35.6	0.7
Rural population..........	45,677,532	24,000,314	7,133,731	14,316,296	52.8	15.7	31.5
RSFSR	74,240,721	40,357,513	22,785,341	5,084,801	62.4	30.7	6.9
Urban population..........	53,890,801	34,595,347	19,110,697	183,336	64.2	35.5	0.3
Rural population..........	20,349,922	11,762,166	3,674,644	4,901,465	57.8	18.1	24.1
Ukrainian SSR	25,838,840	14,562,018	6,766,217	4,500,045	56.4	26.2	17.4
Urban population..........	16,532,232	10,584,928	5,702,381	239,904	64.0	34.5	1.5
Rural population..........	9,306,608	3,977,090	1,063,836	4,260,141	42.7	11.4	45.8
Belorussian SSR	4,981,751	2,864,710	1,333,309	781,857	57.5	26.8	15.7
Urban population..........	2,996,092	1,914,378	1,067,317	13,799	63.9	35.6	0.5
Rural population..........	1,985,661	950,332	265,992	768,058	47.8	13.4	38.7
Uzbek SSR	6,201,077	3,278,883	1,503,010	1,415,421	52.9	24.2	22.8
Urban population..........	2,768,119	1,675,868	999,019	90,585	60.5	36.1	3.3
Rural population..........	3,432,958	1,603,015	503,991	1,324,836	46.7	14.7	38.6
Kazakh SSR	6,892,349	4,513,062	2,056,754	320,289	65.5	29.8	4.7
Urban population..........	4,040,106	2,574,009	1,457,009	8,323	63.7	36.1	0.2
Rural population..........	2,852,241	1,939,053	599,745	311,966	68.0	21.0	10.9
Georgian SSR	2,519,204	1,347,576	765,122	404,717	53.5	30.4	16.0
Urban population..........	1,321,958	725,470	582,499	13,184	54.9	44.1	1.0
Rural population..........	1,197,246	622,106	182,623	391,533	52.0	15.2	32.7
Azerbaijan SSR	2,634,876	1,541,209	680,919	410,391	58.5	25.8	15.6
Urban population..........	1,465,390	912,350	527,424	24,586	62.2	36.0	1.7
Rural population..........	1,169,486	628,859	153,495	385,805	53.8	13.1	33.0
Lithuanian SSR	1,749,467	1,005,374	491,320	251,548	57.4	28.1	14.4
Urban population..........	1,142,241	724,685	412,168	4,900	63.5	36.1	0.4
Rural population..........	607,226	280,689	79,152	246,648	46.2	13.1	40.6
Moldavian SSR	2,059,854	1,105,741	441,263	511,070	53.7	21.4	24.8
Urban population..........	862,039	526,316	313,370	21,836	61.1	36.3	2.5
Rural population..........	1,197,815	579,425	127,893	489,234	48.4	10.7	40.8
Latvian SSR	1,371,608	813,258	426,488	131,537	59.3	31.1	9.6
Urban population..........	990,931	616,390	363,668	10,734	62.2	36.7	1.1
Rural population..........	380,677	196,868	62,820	120,803	51.7	16.5	31.7
Kirghiz SSR	1,493,181	880,461	376,310	235,859	59.0	25.2	15.8
Urban population..........	656,183	414,474	233,224	8,311	63.2	35.5	1.3
Rural population..........	836,998	465,987	143,086	227,548	55.7	17.1	27.2
Tajik SSR	1,493,174	792,770	316,599	382,220	53.1	21.2	25.6
Urban population..........	575,456	353,549	210,235	10,334	61.5	36.5	1.8
Rural population..........	917,718	439,221	106,364	371,886	47.9	11.6	40.5
Armenian SSR	1,440,807	883,673	436,165	120,477	61.3	30.3	8.4
Urban population..........	966,169	594,080	366,969	4,892	61.5	38.0	0.5
Rural population..........	474,638	289,593	69,196	115,585	61.0	14.6	24.3
Turkmen SSR	1,138,378	508,580	263,682	362,111	44.7	23.2	31.8
Urban population..........	577,325	358,340	203,552	11,870	62.1	35.3	2.0
Rural population..........	561,053	150,240	60,130	350,441	26.8	10.7	62.5
Estonian SSR	798,360	485,847	256,546	55,374	60.9	32.1	6.9
Urban population..........	591,077	370,177	215,782	5,027	62.6	36.5	0.9
Rural population..........	207,283	115,670	40,764	50,347	55.8	19.7	24.3

WOMEN IN THE USSR

Women and men have various rights in the USSR.

The implementation of these rights is ensured by assigning women equal opportunity with men in obtaining an education and professional training, in work, rewards for it and advancement in work, in social, political and cultural activities and also by special measures for safeguarding the work and health of women; by creating conditions which make it possible for women to combine work with motherhood; by the legal protection and material and moral support of motherhood and childhood including allocating paid leave and other privileges to pregnant women and mothers, and gradually reducing the working time for mothers who have children of young ages.

Article 35
of the USSR Constitution

1. The number of women in the USSR
(at the beginning of the year)

	Number of women Millions of People	Percentage of Women of the Entire Population
1913--at the end of the year..............	80.1	50.3
1939......................................	99.3	52.1
1959--according to the census of 15 Jan....	114.8	55.0
1966......................................	125.9	54.2
1970--according to the census of 15 Jan....	130.3	53.9
1975......................................	135.8	53.6
1976......................................	136.9	53.5
1977......................................	137.9	53.5
1978......................................	139.0	53.4
1979--according tothe census of 17 Jan.....	140.1	53.4
1980......................................	141.1	53.3

2. Number of women by Union Republics								
	Number of women Thousands of people				Percentage of women of the entire population			
	1939	1959	1970	1980	1939	1959	1970	1980
USSR............	99,273	114,777	130,321	[illegible],089	52	55	54	53
RSFSR..........	57,276	65,109	70,754	74,449	53	55	54	54
Ukrainian SSR...	21,107	23,294	25,821	27,092	52	56	55	54
Belorussian SSR	4,595	4,474	4,864	5,141	52	56	54	53
Uzbek SSR.......	3,069	4,222	6,055	8,021	48	52	51	51
Kazakh SSR......	2,920	4,881	6,746	7,688	48	53	52	52
Georgian SSR....	1,775	2,179	2,484	2,672	50	54	53	53
Azerbaijan SSR..	1,562	1,941	2,634	3,133	49	52	51	51
Lithuanian SSR..	1,499	1,466	1,660	1,809	52	54	53	53
Moldavian SSR...	1,237	1,551	1,907	2,098	50	54	53	53
Latvian SSR.....	998	1,174	1,283	1,364	53	56	54	54
Kirghiz SSR.....	716	1,091	1,532	1,844	49	53	52	51
Tajik SSR.......	715	1,016	1,474	1,974	48	51	51	51
Armenian SSR....	634	921	1,275	1,577	49	52	51	51
Turkmen SSR.....	607	786	1,096	1,435	48	52	51	51
Estonian SSR....	563	672	736	792	53	56	54	54

3. Number of women deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, of union and autonomous republic supreme soviets and local soviets of people's deputies

	Number of women deputies	Percentage of women of the entire number of deputies
USSR Supreme Soviet (1979 elections).........................	487	32
Union Soviet.................	240	32
Soviet of Nationalities.......	247	33
Union republic supreme soviets (1980 elections)...............	2,417	36
Autonomous republic supreme soviets (1980 elections)...............	1,382	40
Kray, oblast, okrug, rayon, city, village and rural soviets of people's deputies (1980 elections).........................	1,127,120	50

In prerevolutionary Russia, women not only did not have suffrage rights but also were deprived of many other civil and political rights or were considerably limited in them.

The Great October Socialist Revolution guaranteed women complete equality in socialist society. Lenin's principle of extensively attracting women to managing the state is being steadfastly fulfilled.

Women comprise almost one-third of the highest organ of the state's authority--the USSR Supreme Soviet. There is not such a broad representation of women in the parliament of a single capitalist country in the world. There are less women in the parliaments of every capitalist country, including those seized, than in the USSR Supreme Soviet. Thus, for example, in the USA there are only 16 women in the 96th session of Congress or 3 percent.

4. Number of women people's judges and people's assessors of local (urban) people's courts by union republics at the beginning of 1980

	Number of women people's judges*	Percentage of women of the total number of people's judges	Number of women people's assessors	Percentage of women of the total number of people's assessors
USSR.............	3,159	33.1	380,900	53.0
RSFSR...........	2,092	36.7	231,900	55.8
Ukrainian SSR...	445	28.4	51,862	52.2
Belorussian SSR	81	25.7	13,104	54.0
Uzbek SSR.......	75	24.7	9,461	39.4
Kazakh SSR......	145	28.0	26,939	47.5
Georgian SSR....	36	21.4	5,771	48.5
Azerbaijan SSR..	24	15.8	5,116	35.5
Lithuanian SSR..	46	32.2	7,423	52.6
Moldavian SSR...	35	26.1	7,296	54.4
Latvian SSR.....	53	56.4	5,103	58.7
Kirghiz SSR.....	25	24.5	4,019	50.3
Tajik SSR.......	27	28.7	3,598	41.3
Armenian SSR....	14	17.1	2,787	41.2
Turkmen SSR.....	25	25.8	3,430	46.7
Estonian SSR....	36	52.2	3,091	59.6

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*Including representatives of local (urban) people's courts.

5. Average annual number of women laborers and office personnel in the national economy		
Years	Number of women laborers and office personnel--Thousands of people	Percentage of women of the total number of workers and office personnel
1940	13,190	39
1945	15,920	56
1950	19,180	47
1955	23,040	46
1960	29,250	47
1965	37,680	49
1970	45,800	51
1975	52,539	51
1980 (estimate)	57,700	51

Soviet power created all of the conditions for women to actively participate in all sectors of the national economy. The greatest percentage of women of the total number of laborers and office workers in 1980 was in trade and public eating establishments--84 percent; in health care, physical fitness and social assistance--83 percent; in national education--74 percent; in culture--73 percent.

In the CPSU Central Committee's draft of "The principal directions for economic and social growth in the USSR 1981-1985 and for the period to 1990" for the 26th Party Congress, it stipulates: "the creation of conditions for strengthening the family, extending the advantages and privileges for families who have children and working mothers."

6. Percentage of women of the total number of laborers and office personnel by Union Republics

	1940	1950	1960	1970	1975	1980
USSR................	39	47	47	51	51	51
RSFSR..............	41	50	50	53	53	53
Ukrainian SSR......	37	43	45	50	52	52
Belorussian SSR....	40	45	49	52	53	53
Uzbek SSR..........	31	40	39	41	42	42
Kazakh SSR.........	30	40	38	47	48	49
Georgian SSR.......	35	40	40	43	45	46
Azerbaijan SSR.....	34	40	38	41	43	43
Lithuanian SSR.....	30	38	43	49	51	52
Moldavian SSR......	35	38	43	51	51	51
Latvian SSR........	36	45	49	53	54	54
Kirghiz SSR........	29	41	41	47	48	48
Tajik SSR..........	29	39	37	38	38	39
Armenian SSR.......	34	40	38	41	45	47
Turkmen SSR........	36	41	36	39	40	41
Estonian SSR.......	35	48	50	53	54	54

1. Percentage of women who take part in work at a kolkhoz of the average annual number of all kolkhoz workers by Union Republics

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979
USSR....................	52	50	50	48	47
RSFSR..................	53	50	49	46	44
Ukrainian SSR.........	54	53	52	50	49
Belorussian SSR.......	55	53	52	50	48
Uzbek SSR.............	45	46	48	49	51
Kazakh SSR............	43	41	40	40	39
Georgian SSR..........	47	46	48	50	51
Azerbaijan SSR........	47	47	46	48	50
Lithuanian SSR........	47	46	46	45	43
Moldavian SSR.........	50	49	51	50	51
Latvian SSR...........	52	51	47	45	44
Kirghiz SSR.	44	43	43	43	44
Tajik SSR.............	42	41	43	44	47
Armenian SSR..........	43	43	44	46	47
Turkmen SSR...........	50	50	48	48	49
Estonian SSR..........	56	51	47	44	42

8. Number of women specialists with a higher or mid-level special education who are employed in the national economy*

Years	All the women with a higher or mid-level special education in thousands of people	Including		Percentage of women with a higher or mid-level special education of the total number of specialists
		Those with a higher education	Those with a mid-level special education	
1928	151	65	86	29
1941	864	312	552	36
1955	3,115	1,155	1,960	61
1960	5,189	1,865	3,324	59
1965	6,941	2,518	4,423	58
1970	9,900	3,568	6,332	59
1975	13,411	4,962	8,449	59
1979	15,545	5,815	9,730	59

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*The data cited are based on materials that were calculated once only: for 1941 on 1 Jan; for 1955 on 1 Jul; for 1960 on 1 Dec; for 1965, 1970, 1975 in the middle of Nov; for 1979 at the beginning of the year (estimate).

In prerevolutionary Russia a very small number of women, chiefly of the privileged strata of society, received an education in higher or special institutions of learning.

In the USSR women receive higher and mid-level special education equally with men. In 1979 the number of women specialists with a higher or mid-level special education who were employed in the national economy comprised 15.5 million people and was greater than in 1940 by a factor of 18.

9. The number of women physicians of all specialists
(at the end of the year)

Years	Thousands of people	As a percentage of the total number of physicians
1940	96.3	62
1950	204.9	77
1955	254.8	76
1960	327.1	76
1965	408.9	74
1970	479.6	72
1975	583.5	70
1979	661.3	69

Women physicians comprise a majority of the total number of physicians.

Based on the latest published data in the USA women physicians comprise only 7 percent of the total number of physicians, or 34,000 people.

10. The number of women on the staff of teachers at general education day schools (by the USSR Ministry of Education and Ministry of Communications schools at the beginning of the academic year)

	Number of women teachers (excluding those that hold more than one position--thousands)	As a percentage of the total number of teachers
All teachers (including school administrators)*		
1940/41	615	60
1950/51	999	70
1960/61	1,312	70
1970/71	1,669	71
1975/76	1,692	71
1979/80--in all	1,649	71
Including:		
Directors of elementary schools	0.2	80
Directors of eight-year schools	15	37
Directors of high schools	18	32
Assistant directors of eight-year schools	13	61
Assistant directors of high schools	82	67
Teachers of grades 1-10 (11) excluding teachers who are school administrators	1,409	80
Music, singing, drawing, drafting, physical education, and vocational teachers	112	36

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*School administrators, as a rule, are simultaneously engaged in teaching work.

Women comprised 60 percent of the teachers of general education day schools in the country during the 1940/41 academic year; at the time the relative proportion of women directors at shortened secondary schools equaled 12 percent, women directors of high schools was 13 percent, women assistant directors of shortened secondary schools was 32 percent and women assistant directors of high schools was 30 percent.

11. Percentage of women students in higher and secondary special education institutions of the total number of students (at the beginning of the academic year)

	1940/41	1950/51	1960/61	1970/71	1975/76	1979/80
Percentage of women that are students of higher educational institutions...	58	53	43	49	50	52
Of the above those who are in the following educational institutions:						
Industry, construction, transportation and communications............	40	30	30	38	40	41
Agriculture.........................	46	39	27	30	33	34
Economics and law...................	64	57	49	60	62	66
Health services, physical education and sports.........................	74	65	56	56	56	57
Education, art and cinematography....	66	71	63	66	68	69
Percentage of women that are studying in mid-level special educational institutions.......................	55	54	47	54	54	56
Of the above those who are in the following educational institutions:						
Industry, construction, transportation and communications............	32	35	33	40	41	43
Agriculture.........................	37	41	38	37	37	37
Economics and law...................	60	73	75	83	85	85
Health services, physical education and sports.........................	83	85	84	87	88	89
Education, art and cinematography....	60	77	76	81	82	84

12. Percentage of women who are students in higher educational institutions in individual countries

Countries	Academic Year	Percentage of women who are students in higher educational institutions
USSR	1979/80	51.7
Bulgaria	1979/80	53.0
Hungary	1979/80	50.1
Vietnam	1978/79	24.0
German Democratic Republic	1979/80	48.2
Mongolian People's Republic	1974/75	35.1
Poland	1978/79	49.8
Romania	1978/79	42.9
Czechoslovakia	1978/79	40.7
Albania	1969/70	32.4
Laos	1974/75	27.5
Yugoslavia	1978/79	39.5
Austria	1977/78	42.7
Afghanistan	1977/78	26.5
Belgium	1977/78	43.1
Great Britain	1977/78	41.6
Denmark	1976/77	41.9
Egypt	1976/77	30.2
India	1977/78	23.0
Italy	1977/78	51.4
Netherlands	1977/78	27.4
Syria	1975/76	25.3
USA	1976/77	46.3
Turkey	1977/78	24.4
German Federal Republic	1979/80	41.3
France*	1976/77	48.4
Sweden	1976/77	41.2
Japan	1977/78	28.1

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* In universities.

13. Number of women who are scientific workers
(at the end of the year; thousands of people)

	1950	1960	1970	1975	1979
All women scientific workers	59.0	128.7	359.9	488.3	531.1
Those who have a scientific degree:					
Doctors of science........................	0.6	1.1	3.1	4.5	5.2
Candidates of science......................	11.4	28.8	60.7	94.0	107.5
Of the total number of women scientific workers those who have a science title:					
Academicians, member-correspondents, professors..................................	0.5	0.7	1.8	2.4	2.9
Assistant professors.......................	3.2	6.2	14.4	19.6	25.2
Senior scientific workers..................	3.5	5.8	9.8	12.5	14.4
Junior scientific workers and assistants.....	9.4	13.6	24.3	22.3	20.2

In 1979 women comprised 40 percent of the total number of scientific workers in the country, 14 percent of the total number of doctors of science and 28 percent of the candidates of science.

In 1979, 28,200 women were doing graduate work or 29 percent of the total number of graduate students.

In the USA, based on the latest published data, the proportion of women of the total number of scientific workers comprised 9.2 percent.

14. Number of women who are scientific workers by Union Republics at the end of 1979

	Total	Those who have a science degree		Of the total number of women scientific workers, those who have a scientific title			
		Doctors of Science	Candidates of Science	Academicians, member correspondents, professors	Assistant professors	Senior scientific workers	Junior scientific workers and assistants
USSR............	531,071	5,217	107,494	2,876	25,115	14,407	20,193
RSFSR............	369,795	3,582	71,098	1,846	15,819	9,038	14,388
Ukrainian SSR....	70,539	682	14,385	419	3,941	1,782	967
Belorussian SSR..	14,833	85	2,928	60	835	386	702
Uzbek SSR........	12,331	115	3,177	71	851	400	617
Kazakh SSR.......	14,512	133	3,467	100	1,001	435	678
Georgian SSR.....	9,917	179	2,636	102	640	630	274
Azerbaijan SSR...	8,235	104	1,901	65	411	411	1,095
Lithuanian SSR...	5,070	48	1,446	34	401	212	13
Moldavian SSR....	3,075	37	910	23	191	119	30
Latvian SSR......	5,050	64	1,428	32	318	215	376
Kirghiz SSR......	3,328	39	819	31	161	143	12
Tajik SSR........	2,837	25	623	25	153	88	189
Armenian SSR.....	7,216	80	1,514	44	255	342	656
Turkmen SSR......	2,079	16	475	10	100	81	--
Estonian SSR.....	2,254	28	687	14	138	125	196

15. Expenditures according to the USSR State Budget, for grant payments to mothers, for education and services for children (millions of rubles)

	1940	1950	1960	1970	1975	1979
Grants for pregnancy and childbirth, for mothers with many children and unmarried mothers, for articles for the care and feeding of a child and for children of families that are not sufficiently provided for*..........	179	542	1,005	1,301	2,512	2,603
Expenses for services for children in children's homes, kindergartens, nursery-kindergartens, nurseries, pioneer camps and institutions that work with children in schools (excluding expenses for capital investments)............................	423	1,283	1,725	4,298	5,584	6,911
Expenditures for the maintenance of general education day schools including boarding schools (excluding expenditures for capital investments)..	858	1,972	3,135	6,604	8,168	8,589

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[*] In addition the grants are paid for pregnancy and childbirth, for articles for the care and feeding of a child and for children of families that are not sufficiently provided for from central union social welfare funds and social insurance funds for kolkhoz workers (millions of rubles): in 1970--97; in 1975--465; in 1979--432.

Expenditures, according to the USSR State Budget, for the maintenance of general education day schools, including boarding schools, increased in 1979 in comparison with 1940, expenses for kindergartens, kindergarten-nurseries and nurseries increased by a factor of 22.3. Along with funds from the state budget funds are also spent on services for children by state, cooperative, trade union and other social organizations and kolkhoz funds.

In 1973 grants for pregnancy and childbirth were established in the amount of a full salary, irrespective of the length of work service, for all working women; the number of paid days of leave due to a sick child increased and since 1 Nov 1974 grants were established for children in workers' families that are insufficiently provided for. The practice was introduced of providing textbooks free of charge to pupils in grades 1 through 5 of general education schools. Beginning with 1981 partial paid vacation is being introduced throughout the rayons of the country for working women to have a leave of absence for a child until he has reached the age of one year.

16. Number of mothers with many children who receive a monthly state grant (thousands of people)

	1945	1950	1960	1970	1975	1979
The number of mothers with many children who receive a grant......................	844	3,079	3,455	3,211	2,605	2,233
Including those:						
with four children..........	287	1,449	1,660	1,172	841	749
with five children..........	181	839	899	782	583	486
with six children...........	100	440	484	546	430	338
with seven and more children	276	351	412	711	751	660

Mothers who have two children receive a monthly grant from the state upon the birth of the third and each subsequent child, while those who have three children receive a monthly grant upon the birth of the fourth and each subsequent child.

In 1979, 2,233,000 mothers received monthly state grants for four or more children; in addition, 286,000 mothers who have two children received a monthly state grant upon the birth of a third child.

Women who gave birth to 5 or more children and who have raised them to the age of 8 have additional advantages in obtaining a pension based on age as well as length of work service.

17. Number of mothers with many children who have had the honorary title of "Mother Heroine" conferred upon them and the number of mothers with many children who have been awarded Orders of "Maternal Glory" and the "Medal of Motherhood"
(Thousands)

	From Jul 1944 through 1949	From 1950 through 1979	Total
Those with the title "Mother-Heroine" conferred upon them	31	273	304
Number of those awarded Orders of "Maternal Glory":			
Grade I	67	586	653
Grade II	193	1,171	1,364
Grade III	468	2,117	2,585
Number of those awarded "Medal of Motherhood":			
Grade I	754	3,457	4,211
Grade II	1,434	5,546	6,980

Mothers have nationwide honor in the USSR. The honorary title of "Mother-Heroine" is conferred upon mothers who have given birth to and raised 10 children and they are presented with the Order of "Mother-Heroine."

The Order of "Maternal Glory" was established to award to mothers who have given birth to and raised 7, 8 and 9 children, while the "Medal of Motherhood" is to be awarded to mothers who have given birth to and raised 5 and 6 children.

18. Medical and Dispensary Assistance for Women
(at the end of the year; thousands)

	1940	1950	1960	1970	1975	1979
Number of beds (medical and obstetric) for pregnant women and those in labor....	147.1	143.0	213.4	223.8	223.0	228.7
Number of consultation offices for females, pediatric polyclinics and dispensaries (independent or as part of other institutions..........	8.6	11.3	16.4	21.0*	22.1	23.8*

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*The number of consultation offices for females comprised 9,700 in 1970, 10,400 in 1979; the number of pediatric polyclinics and dispensaries comprised 11,300 in 1970 and 13,400 in 1979.

The safeguarding of motherhood in the USSR is ensured by a state system of special institutions (maternity homes, maternity hospitals and consultation offices for females and others) that are entrusted with the care of women's health. Medical assistance for mothers, as for the entire population, is rendered free of charge.

In 1979, 229,000 medical and obstetric beds had been established for pregnant women and women in labor; in 1940 they numbered 147,000.

In prerevolutionary Russia there were 9 consultation offices in all that served women and children; in 1940, consultation offices for females and pediatric polyclinics and dispensaries already numbered 8,600 and by the end of 1979 24,000 or greater by a factor of 2.8 than in 1940.

At the present time practically all women are provided with medical assistance during childbirth. In 1911 only 5.2 percent of pregnant women received medical assistance during childbirth.

19. Number of beds (medical and obstetric) for pregnant women and women in labor by Union Republic (at the end of the year; thousands)

	1940	1950	1960	1970	1975	1979
USSR................	147.1	143.0	213.4	223.8	223.0	228.7
RSFSR..............	90.7	82.7	112.9	110.3	110.5	113.0
Ukrainian SSR......	35.0	33.7	48.9	45.1	41.6	39.4
Belorussian SSR....	5.4	4.4	6.7	6.9	7.0	7.2
Uzbek SSR..........	2.8	3.5	8.7	13.4	15.2	18.6
Kazakh SSR.........	4.3	4.9	11.9	16.3	15.7	16.5
Georgian SSR.......	1.9	2.5	3.9	4.4	4.4	4.2
Azerbaijan SSR.....	2.0	2.1	3.3	5.6	5.9	6.5
Lithuanian SSR.....	0.4	1.7	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5
Moldavian SSR......	0.6	1.7	4.2	4.5	4.1	3.5
Latvian SSR........	0.8	1.1	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.6
Kirghiz SSR........	0.8	1.0	2.6	4.0	4.2	4.4
Tajik SSR..........	0.6	0.8	1.4	2.9	3.3	3.9
Armenian SSR.......	0.7	1.2	2.2	2.8	2.9	2.8
Turkmen SSR........	0.8	0.9	1.7	2.8	3.2	3.6
Estonian SSR.......	0.3	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0

20. Preschool Institutions
(at the end of the year; thousands)

	1940	1950	1960	1970	1975	1979
Number of permanent preschool institutions................	46.0	45.2	70.6	102.7	115.2	125.4
Including:						
nurseries..................	22.0	19.6	27.0	19.6	15.8	12.8
kindergartens..............	24.0	25.6	37.4	35.4	34.1	32.6
nursery-kindergartens......	--	--	6.2	47.7	65.3	80.0
Number of children in permanent preschool institutions	1,953	1,788	4,428	9,281	11,523	13,778
Including those:						
in nurseries...............	781	619	1,313	1,181	1,053	915
in kindergartens...........	1,172	1,169	2,756	2,791	2,591	2,441
in nursery-kindergartens...	--	--	359	5,309	7,879	10,422

In addition to permanent preschool institutions, seasonal preschool institutions, and children's playgrounds are organized during the summer period; about 5 million children were served by them including almost 2 million children of preschool age.

In 1981-85, it is projected that preschool institutions with no less than 2.5 million seats are to be built.

21. Number of children in permanent preschool institutions by Union Republics (at the end of the year; thousands of people)

	1940	1950	1960	1970	1975	1979
USSR................	1,953	1,788	4,428	9,281	11,523	13,778
RSFSR...............	1,266	1,239	3,038	5,666	6,681	7,847
Ukrainian SSR......	319	251	589	1,574	2,038	2,367
Belorussian SSR....	64	29	98	274	373	462
Uzbek SSR..........	74	66	173	348	561	849
Kazakh SSR.........	37	46	170	564	709	846
Georgian SSR.......	48	33	58	116	143	165
Azerbaijan SSR.....	57	31	53	111	127	144
Lithuanian SSR.....	14	8	21	80	119	142
Moldavian SSR......	5	7	28	91	188	254
Latvian SSR........	6	.	26	72	91	108
Kirghiz SSR........	7	10	36	90	119	145
Tajik SSR..........	8	10	32	68	87	104
Armenian SSR.......	18	13	33	90	111	131
Turkmen SSR........	25	27	52	78	102	131
Estonian SSR.......	5	8	21	59	74	83

22. Number of women physical education instructors (at the end of the year; millions)

	1950	1960	1970	1975	1979
Number of physical education teachers	14.2	28.7	43.6	50.1	66.6
of these the number of women instructors..........................	5.3	10.1	15.3	17.3	21.1

In 1979, 41 Soviet women were awarded the exalted title of world champion; 58 women were awarded champion of Europe; 84 Soviet women established all union records; of these, 39 surpassed world records.

In 1980 at the 13th winter and 12th summer Olympic Games Soviet women won 24 gold, 18 silver, and 17 bronze medals.

At the present time, women number 59,000 of the regular staff of workers in physical education (teachers, trainers).

[illegible]. Children's and youth sports schools
(at the end of the year)

	1950	1960	1970	1975	1979
Number of children's and youth sports schools	302	1,81[illegible]	3,813	5,396	6,[illegible]
Number who participated in activities in them, thousands of people	115.7	533.6	1,323.4	1,770.7	2,215.9
Of these, the number of girls and young women	41.[illegible]	205.[illegible]	480.9	576.1	[illegible]

[illegible]. Children's institutions that are part of schools
(at the end of the year)

	19[illegible]		1975		1979	
	Number of Institutions	Children Served by Them, Thousands	Number of Institutions	Children Served by Them, Thousands	Number of Institutions	Children Served by Them, Thousands
All institutions that are part of schools	[illegible]	27,415	80,366	33,842	95,341	40,325
Including:						
[illegible]	[illegible]	1,601	4,403	2,190	4,783	2,900
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1,008	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Young naturalists' centers	[illegible]	[illegible]	587	206	793	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	1,065	202	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Children's parks	[illegible]	[illegible]	155	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Children's railroads	[illegible]	[illegible]	38	35	[illegible]	41
Summer pioneer camps	[illegible]	8,806	45,980	9,936	57,761	11,[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	862	6,109	1,080	7,364	[illegible]
Independent children's libraries	6,498	12,810	7,586	16,399	8,[illegible]	19,[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1,[illegible]	188	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	462	[illegible]	[illegible]	7,[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	5,396	1,777	6,196	2,236
Other children's institutions [illegible]	[illegible]	18	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible] Institutions under the USSR Ministry of Culture [illegible] (at the end of the year, thousands)

	[illegible]	1975	1979	
			Total	Including artistic [illegible] activities
Number [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] in them	2,.88	2,856	3,768	3,[illegible]

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MIXED NATIONALITY MARRIAGES DISCUSSED BY ETHNOGRAPHER

Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 27 Dec 80 p 2

[Interview with Candidate of Historical Sciences L. N. Terent'yeva, deputy director of the Institute of Ethnography imeni N. N. Miklukho-Maklay of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by Natal'ya Vishneva-Sarafanova: "The Soviet Family Through the Prism of Ethnography"]

> [Text] There are 66.3 million families in the USSR, more than 14 percent of which are ethnically mixed. Candidate of Historical Sciences L. N. Terent'yeva, Deputy Director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Ethnography imeni N. N. Miklukho-Maklay, spoke with Academy of Pedagogical Sciences correspondent Natal'ya Vishneva-Sarafanova about the reasons for the growth in mixed-nationality marriages in the country.

[Question] Lyudmila Nikolayevna, what can you tell us about the mixed-nationality marriage from the viewpoint of exercising the right of a person to choose a life's companion?

[Answer] Choosing a life's companion of any nationality is one manifestation of human freedom. And if any given society deems mixed-nationality marriages an anomaly, that society can hardly be considered democratic.

Thus, in prerevolutionary Russia, mixed marriages were a rarity. The Law Code of the Russian Empire did not permit members of the Orthodox Church to marry nonbelievers. Islam erected artificial barriers between Moslems and those of other faiths who wanted to marry them. Judaism condemned ethnic and racial mixing in Russia.

By prerevolutionary standards, my own family was unlawful. It now unites four nationalities, but no one is surprised at that. This is a result of the actualization in our country of the principle that all humanity is a single biological species, that there are no "superior" or "inferior" races.

[Question] What has helped break down international barriers in our country?

[Answer] All Soviet citizens have equal constitutional rights and duties, regardless of nationality, sex, beliefs or social origin. The development of education and culture and the growth in atheism have also led to the gradual disappearance of national and religious prejudices.

Soviet people, be they Yakut or Russian, Kabardin, Lett, Bashkir or Georgian, are united in the joint construction of a new society. The country's dynamically developing migrational processes are also helping draw nations and peoples closer together. From the start of the first five-year plan up to today, more than 60 million new residents have moved to the cities. It is basically the young, fast on their feet, who have come, of course. At some large construction sites, I have met representatives of 70 nations and nationalities.

[Question] What can you tell us, as an ethnographer, about your field of activity?

[Answer] We ethnographers have available to us an amazing "laboratory" on a nationwide scale. Judge for yourself: according to 1979 Census data, upwards of 120 peoples live in the USSR, large and small, from the Aleuts and Negidal' (400-500 people) to the Russians (137 million). And more and more material for study is being added each year.

[Question] What results have been achieved by Soviet ethnographers studying international marriages?

[Answer] The general statistical data and materials from ethnosociological research indicate that the number of international marriages here is growing throughout the country and in each of the 15 Soviet republics. Whereas quite recently one in every 10 marriages in the USSR was mixed, that number now exceeds 14 percent of the total number of families.

The percentage of nationality-mixed families is highest in Latvia, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, where one in every five marriages is mixed-nationality.

Ethnographers have noted that there are more nationality-mixed families in the cities of all union republics than in rural areas. Thus, the proportion of nationality-mixed families reaches 23.7 percent in the cities of the Central Asian republics. The highest percentage of such families is accounted for by cities in Moldavia, the Ukraine and Belorussia: 30-40 percent.

[Question] But doesn't the language barrier hamper the rapprochement of nations?

[Answer] It hardly exists here. Although all nations and nationalities have an opportunity to study in their native languages and to speak and write in them, Russian has become the means of intercourse among them.

[Question] Is a multinational family strong?

[Answer] Some foreign ethnographers think that marriages between nationalities provide considerably fewer opportunities for spouses to adapt to one another than in "homogeneous" marriages, but it seems to me that it doesn't even make sense to pose the question of the physiological or social superiority of "homogeneous" marriages over mixed ones (or the reverse).

Of course, it is not a simple matter to create a mixed family. In marriages between nationalities, spousal relations are associated with a greater difference in psychology, traditions and living standards than usual, so the husband and wife must respect the customs and peculiarities of each other's nation, its cultural and everyday living structures.

Paradoxically, life verifies that when spouses from different nationalities encounter a number of difficulties in getting established, they possess some sort of additional potential for overcoming them. Sociologists have verified that the percentage of divorces in inter-nationality marriages is considerably lower than that for same-nationality marriages.

[Question] To what nationality do children born of mixed marriages belong?

[Answer] Nationality is legally recorded when the boy or girl reaches age 16 and obtains an internal passport. The young citizen must determine his nationality himself, either his mother's or his father's.

This problem is solved in different ways by young people. Both the ethnic environment in which the family lives and the duration of the ties between the parents' nations, the force of family traditions and the closeness of the languages influence the choice of nationality.

An historically new community of people, the Soviet people, has been shaped through more than 60 years of Soviet power in our multinational state, and I think each inter-nationality marriage strengthens that community.

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